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Sharp turns in the Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence have left scholars reeling from conflicting emotions:
exhilaration, despair, denial, and soon, perhaps, cynical acceptance. While
most commentators celebrated the demise of the incoherent Ohio v. Roberts
framework, their excitement largely faded as the Court’s decisions in Davis v.
Washington and Bryant v. Michigan revealed nascent flaws in the evolving
doctrine and sharply curtailed the newly revitalized confrontation right.
Recent scholarship strives to reanimate the jurisprudence by expanding the
doctrinal definition of “testimonial” statements – the sole form of evidence
∗
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that the Court now recognizes as implicating the Confrontation Clause. This
Article targets a similar objective through a less-traveled path. It accepts the
Court’s focus on, and definition of, “testimonial” statements as a valid, even
inevitable, jurisprudential development. This Article seeks instead to expand
the reach of the confrontation right to “nontestimonial” hearsay, arguing that
constitutional limits – albeit less strict ones – are also warranted for this type
of evidence in light of the policies, text, and history of the Confrontation
Clause. The Article then details how the Supreme Court can (consistent with
the overarching historical, textual, and policy arguments noted above)
integrate these limits on the admission of nontestimonial hearsay into its new
jurisprudence.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”
– United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment
“I know not why . . . a man should have a constitutional claim to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in
his absence, may be evidence against him.”
– Chief Justice John Marshall1
INTRODUCTION
Commentators cheered when the Supreme Court decided Crawford v.
Washington2 in 2004.3 The decision finally put “some teeth in the
1

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.14,694).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3 See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph
of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 192
(2005) (describing Crawford as “a successful blend of originalism and formalism” that
announced a rule that “turns on simple, clear requirements of testimony, cross-examination,
and unavailability, rather than ad hoc estimates of reliability”); Jeffrey L. Fisher,
Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1496
(2006) (describing Crawford as a “significant victor[y]” for the “criminal defense bar” that
“restored clarity to confrontation law”); Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning
of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 273 (2005) (arguing that Crawford “represent[s]
a great and beneficial development”); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford,
91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750, 767 (2005) (stating that Crawford’s “reasoning is difficult to
refute, and its fealty to early constitutional history is admirable”; it is “a salutary
development in confrontation law”); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 512,
522 (2005) (explaining that Crawford has “given real teeth to the Confrontation Clause in
several frequently encountered and important situations” and forecasting “a future in which
substantially more confrontation may be provided”); Roger C. Park, Purpose As a Guide to
the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 297, 297 (2005) (“I
applaud the change from Ohio v. Roberts to Crawford v. Washington . . . .”); Robert M.
2
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Confrontation Clause,” repudiating the wishy-washy and widely-reviled Ohio
v. Roberts4 framework that governed the Court’s jurisprudence over the
preceding two decades.5 Adding to the excitement, the reinvigoration of the
Sixth Amendment confrontation right was led by Justice Scalia playing
counter-to-type and striking a resounding blow against prosecutorial power.6
Crawford was a victory not just for criminal defendants, but for the
Constitution as well. The Crawford Court reversed a conviction because the
prosecution had introduced unconfronted, “testimonial” hearsay – the type of
evidence most analogous to the sworn statements of absent witnesses that the
Sixth Amendment’s drafters abhorred.7 Such hearsay is inadmissible against a
criminal defendant, Crawford announced, because the Sixth Amendment
demands face-to-face confrontation, not the “malleable” tests of reliability set
forth in Roberts.8
As ambitious as the case was, Crawford only mapped out the rough contours
of the long-awaited Confrontation Clause revolution, leaving a number of
important questions “for another day.”9 As the Supreme Court began to
answer those questions in later cases, the new jurisprudence took a dramatic
and surprising turn. Three years after Crawford, the Court strictly cabined the
category of hearsay to which the reinvigorated confrontation right applied.
Specifically, Davis v. Washington10 held that while “testimonial” hearsay was
inadmissible absent confrontation, “nontestimonial” hearsay – a broad category
of admissible hearsay – was “not subject to the Confrontation Clause” at all.11
The next blow to the celebrated reinvigoration of the Confrontation Clause
came in the 2011 case of Michigan v. Bryant.12 In Bryant, a new majority of
the Supreme Court seized the evolving jurisprudence from Justice Scalia’s
guiding hand and, while claiming fidelity to Crawford, constricted the
definition of “testimonial” statements to its minimalist core: statements
Pitler, Symposium Introduction, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2005) (recounting postCrawford exuberance among attorneys and scholars involved in the case, as well as in
newspaper reports).
4 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5 See Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569,
607 (2004).
6 Bibas, supra note 3, at 184 (noting the apparent irony that “Justice Scalia, long the
darling of tough-on-crime conservatives” authored an opinion that “vindicated criminal
defendants’ rights,” but adding that Justice Scalia had “occasionally shown a libertarian,
pro-defendant streak in the past”).
7 See infra pp. 47-48.
8 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60, 69 (2004) (“[T]he only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”).
9 Id. at 68.
10 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
11 Id. at 821.
12 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
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“procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.”13 In addition, the Bryant Court erected a framework for analyzing
“primary purpose” that appears just as malleable as the Roberts test – a
flexibility that, if Roberts is any guide, is more likely to favor the prosecution
(by admitting hearsay) than the defense (by excluding it).14 Together, Bryant
and Davis work a dramatic curtailment of the post-Crawford confrontation
right. The current Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Confrontation Clause
addresses only “testimonial” statements, in concert with its pointed narrowing
of the definition of “testimonial,” results in the elimination (not strengthening)
of the constitutional restrictions on the bulk of admissible hearsay.15 As
Bryant itself declares, statements admitted under many commonly utilized
hearsay exceptions – for example, excited utterances, present sense
impressions, co-conspirator statements, statements for medical diagnosis or
treatment – will rarely be testimonial and consequently are now completely
unregulated by the Confrontation Clause.16
Scrambling to respond to the twists and turns of modern Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, the Court’s critics, now including Justice Scalia, target
13 Id. at 1155. Justice Scalia argued in dissent that a testimonial statement is one that is
made “with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the
State against the accused.” Id. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52
(suggesting as one possible definition of “testimonial”: “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial”). In Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221, 2243 (2012), Justice Alito proposed a further narrowing of the definition to statements
“prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.” Only three other
Justices, however, joined his opinion. Id. at 31 (plurality opinion).
14 See Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require That Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 695-96
(2007) (remarking that Roberts “often resulted in scant protection as a practical matter” and
“[o]nly occasionally . . . provide[d] protection even against facially problematic hearsay”);
sources cited infra note 48; cf. Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 182 (Pa. 2012)
(holding that a child’s statement to an investigating social worker that identified defendant
as perpetrator of child abuse was not testimonial under Bryant); Lininger, supra note 3, at
767.
15 See Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the
Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 468 n.291 (2007); Tom
Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is A Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 405
(2005) (“[O]ne of Crawford’s greatest shortcomings is its failure to specify confrontation
requirements for nontestimonial hearsay.”).
16 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9 (emphasizing that statements admissible pursuant to
many common hearsay exceptions “are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use
in a prosecution”); cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of
Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 357, 360 (2012) (emphasizing the
increasing role, in light of changing communication norms, for present sense impressions in
litigation, and the absence of Confrontation Clause restrictions on their admission).

2012]

INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

1869

the contracting definition of “testimonial.” They urge the Court to capture
more hearsay within the Confrontation Clause by adopting a broader definition
of this critical term.17 This Article steers clear of that debate, accepting as
generally sound the Court’s identification of a subset of out-of-court
statements (roughly characterized as those made for purposes of litigation) that
implicate the core of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Instead, this
Article proposes a different path toward a more muscular Confrontation Clause
– a path that few scholars have suggested, much less fleshed out in any detail.18
Specifically, the Article argues that, contrary to the Court’s largely
unsupported (yet unanimous) conclusion in Davis, the Confrontation Clause is
not solely concerned with “testimonial” statements, but also restricts the
admission of “nontestimonial” hearsay, albeit to a lesser degree.
While sharply criticizing the Court’s recent decisions, this Article
recognizes that, by severely restricting the admissibility of testimonial hearsay,
Crawford and its progeny indisputably improve Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. The admission of testimonial hearsay (narrowly defined)
presents a unique affront to the Confrontation Clause. If it is to do nothing
else, the Clause must prevent the prosecution, with its inherent advantage in
structuring criminal trials, from procuring admissible out-of-court substitutes
for live testimony and thereby extinguishing the defendant’s right to cross
examination. When government agents generate out-of-court statements with
an eye toward litigation, Crawford and its progeny rightly forbid the use of
those statements absent confrontation. The Court is wrong, however, to
suggest that preventing “abusive governmental practices” is the only function
of the confrontation right.19 The right also embodies a general preference for

17 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again:
The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1321 (2011)
(“[T]he proper inquiry to determine whether a statement is testimonial involves the
statement’s use at trial.”); Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After
Crawford v. Washington: Defining “Testimonial,” 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 543
(2006) (“[T]he term testimonial should be defined as all accusatory hearsay, i.e., hearsay
that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the identification of the
defendant.”); Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened – and What Is Happening – to the
Confrontation Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 627 (2007) (arguing that “the best way to
determine” whether a statement implicates the Confrontation Clause “is to ask whether the
person was narrating completed events to a person of authority”); Friedman, supra note 3, at
242 (presenting “a broad conceptual approach to the meaning of ‘testimonial’”); Josephine
Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testimony and
“Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 193 (2006)
(proposing that the Court “adopt[] a functional approach to the term testimonial” that
considers “whether the evidence functioned as testimony against the accused at the trial”).
18 See infra note 187 (describing two similar but nonetheless distinct proposals).
19 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasizing the danger of the “introduction of out-ofcourt statements . . . in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation
of a witness to obtain evidence for trial”); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to
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live testimony that compels prosecutors to produce available witnesses at trial
instead of out-of-court assertions, whether those assertions are labeled
“testimonial” or “nontestimonial.”20 It is this general preference, once a
central facet of the confrontation right,21 that is inexcusably absent from the
Court’s new jurisprudence.
The path forward lies in preserving what the Court got right in Crawford (its
intolerance for testimonial hearsay), while repairing its subsequent missteps
(its indifference to nontestimonial hearsay). An important component of this
approach is the recognition that interpreting the confrontation right to apply to
nontestimonial as well as testimonial hearsay does not mean that both types of
hearsay should be treated identically. As the admission of nontestimonial
statements does not strike as closely to the historical and textual core of the
confrontation right, it need not be restricted as severely (that is, excluded
absent confrontation). Rather, prior to admitting such evidence, courts can
enforce a constitutional preference for live testimony – as they have in other
contexts – by requiring the prosecution to demonstrate the out-of-court
declarant’s “unavailability.”22 If a declarant is unavailable, the prosecutor can
introduce her nontestimonial hearsay; but if the declarant can testify, the
prosecutor must offer that testimony, rather than rely solely on the declarant’s
hearsay.
This Article’s proposed modification of modern Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence remedies the unjustified absence of constitutional restrictions on
unconfronted, nontestimonial hearsay. It also provides an opportunity to unify
the nascent jurisprudence around a single uncontroversial principle: an
overarching preference for live-witness testimony.23 The principle requires
that, in making a case against a defendant, the prosecution must, whenever
possible, choose live-witness testimony over “weaker” out-of-court
substitutes.24 Crawford-era jurisprudence implicitly recognizes this principle,
requiring witnesses to be brought to trial in lieu of the introduction of their

Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 616 (1992)
(arguing that while government abuse is part of the rationale for the Clause, it “operates not
as a direct restraint on abusive governmental practices, but as a grant of positive rights to
those charged with a crime”); infra Part III.
20 See infra Parts II, III.
21 See infra Part III.
22 See infra Part III.
23 See David Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1655 (2009)
(criticizing the absence in Crawford of “any serious effort to identify the underlying point of
confrontation” (quoting Roger C. Park, Is Confrontation the Bottom Line?, 19 REGENT U. L.
REV. 459, 466 (2007))).
24 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (characterizing testimonial hearsay as
a “weaker substitute for live testimony”); see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (same).
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testimonial hearsay.25 As this Article explains, the Court should extend its
application of the principle more broadly to nontestimonial statements as well.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I emphasizes the aspects of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that the Supreme Court got right in
Crawford. This Part characterizes the groundbreaking decisions of the past
few years, and particularly the novel testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy, as
a firm step forward in the Court’s long struggle to interpret the enigmatic
constitutional text. Part II hones in on what the Court got wrong in its new
jurisprudence, critiquing the analytical moves made by the post-Crawford
Court that lead not only to an appropriate focus on testimonial statements, but
also to an erroneous conclusion that such statements constitute the sum total of
out-of-court statements that implicate the Confrontation Clause. Part III posits
an improved interpretation of the confrontation right in light of the text,
history, and underlying policies of the Confrontation Clause.
This
interpretation, while parallel in many respects to existing jurisprudence,
incorporates one critical difference – providing constitutional limits in the form
of an unavailability requirement on the admission of nontestimonial hearsay.
Part IV considers the policy implications of the proposal. By building on the
Court’s recent progress in interpreting the Confrontation Clause, and by
eliminating the Court’s unfortunate interpretive errors, the proposed reform
provides the basis for achieving a long-elusive goal: a Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence that is sensible, coherent, and strongly tethered to the text and
history of the Sixth Amendment.
I.

WHAT THE COURT GOT RIGHT: TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Analyzing Crawford in a broader context reveals with inescapable clarity
that the decision represents a step forward in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. As explained below, given the right perspective, Crawford, or a
decision much like it, seems not only correct, but almost inevitable, both in
terms of the Court’s rejection of Roberts and its adoption of a testimonialnontestimonial analytical dichotomy.
A.

The Enduring Challenge of Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence

Any assessment of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence must begin with the
“sparse” constitutional text.26 The Sixth Amendment guarantee of an
accused’s right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him”27 spawns an
array of possible interpretations. At a minimum, the right guarantees a
defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine any witness called by the
25

As explained below, the principle applies more strictly to testimonial statements,
requiring exclusion of unavailable declarants’ testimonial hearsay.
Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also infra Part III.B.
26 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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prosecution at trial.28 After a prosecution witness testifies, the defense must be
permitted to test the witness’s credibility before the jury through crossexamination, the “‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth.’”29 The difficult interpretive question is how this right applies when the
prosecution offers out-of-court statements of absent declarants – hearsay – as
substantive evidence against the accused.30
Over a century ago, Dean Wigmore took a famously narrow view,
contending that the Confrontation Clause provides a right to cross-examine any
live witness who testifies for the prosecution at trial, and nothing more.31
Limits on the introduction of the statements of out-of-court declarants,
Wigmore argued, were the province of the hearsay rules, not the
Constitution.32 At the other extreme, the Confrontation Clause could be
interpreted to bar any unconfronted statement whether made in or out of court.
That interpretation would override “virtually every hearsay exception” the
prosecution might invoke in a criminal trial.33
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the two extreme positions
described above, claiming throughout its history to be charting “a middle
course.”34 In one of its first encounters with the Confrontation Clause, in the

28 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (characterizing the “‘right to meet face
to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial’” as “the irreducible literal meaning
of the Clause” (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (“‘The main and essential
purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.’” (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940))); AKHIL AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 129 (1997); Sklansky, supra note 23, at 1645
(“The meaning of the term ‘confronted’ in the Sixth Amendment is . . . largely settled, and
has been so for decades. Confrontation means an opportunity for cross-examination by
defense counsel in front of the jury, ordinarily with the defendant and the witness both in the
courtroom.”).
29 Green, 399 at 158 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 1367).
30 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43; cf. John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant
Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1875 (2001) (“The problem of applying the
Confrontation Clause to hearsay is among the most perplexing dilemmas of constitutional
criminal procedure.”).
31 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1397, at 1755 (1st ed. 1904); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 Wigmore argued: “The rule sanctioned by the Constitution is the hearsay rule as to
cross-examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found, developed, or
created therein.” WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1397, at 1755.
33 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (stating that under this interpretation, “the
Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as
unintended and too extreme”).
34 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.9.

2012]

INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

1873

1895 case of Mattox v. United States,35 the Court recognized that the
confrontation right bars the introduction of some, but not all, out-of-court
statements introduced against a defendant at trial.36 The Court has never
explicitly wavered from this position, but its subsequent failure to chart a
coherent middle path plagues the resulting jurisprudence.37
To date, the Court has undertaken two major efforts to draw a dividing line
between permissible and impermissible hearsay under the Confrontation
Clause. In the 1980 case of Roberts v. Ohio, the Court synthesized a “general
Although short on constitutional
approach” from its precedents.38
interpretation,39 Roberts boils down to a fairly intuitive logical argument: (1)
the Sixth Amendment mandates confrontation to ensure that testimony is
reliable, and thus (2) if the reliability of hearsay can be established in some
other way (for example, by a judicial determination of reliability),
confrontation is not required.40
In 2004, the Crawford Court famously overturned Roberts, rejecting the
significance under the Sixth Amendment of a judicial endorsement of an outof-court statement’s reliability.41 “The only indicium of reliability sufficient to
satisfy constitutional demands,” Crawford announced, “is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”42 Under Crawford and its
progeny, whether an out-of-court statement implicates the Confrontation
Clause depends on how the statement came about – that is, the statement’s
“primary purpose.”43 If a statement is made or elicited primarily with an eye
toward litigation, it is “testimonial” and generally inadmissible against the
defendant, absent confrontation, in a criminal trial.44 If the statement is made
35

156 U.S. 237 (1895).
Id. at 242-43.
37 Akhil Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 690 (1996)
(“[M]odern Supreme Court caselaw on the clause is surprisingly muddled in logic and
exposition.”).
38 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
39 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6367 (1972) (stating that Roberts “makes no attempt to anchor its theory in
either the language of the Sixth Amendment or its history”).
40 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (describing the “underlying purpose” of the Confrontation
Clause as being “to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant
an effective means to test adverse evidence”); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critiquing the Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence as “abstract[ing] from the right to its purposes, and then eliminat[ing] the
right”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to Which
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules,
76 MINN. L. REV. 521, 525 (1992).
41 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 68.
44 Crawford left the precise definition of testimonial undefined. Id. The most recent
36

1874

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1865

or elicited with some other primary purpose, however, such as to evaluate and
respond to an ongoing emergency, or as part of a casual conversation among
friends, the statement is “nontestimonial” and its admission does not implicate
the Confrontation Clause.45
B.

The Testimonial-Nontestimonial Dichotomy

The Crawford framework’s clear improvement over Roberts appears in its
analytical separation of “core,” “testimonial” statements from all other
hearsay.46 While some commentators criticize Crawford’s “testimonial”“nontestimonial” dichotomy,47 such a distinction is essential to any coherent
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. As discussed below, the failure of
Roberts to prohibit unconfronted, testimonial hearsay led most directly to the
case’s repudiation, and properly so.
The Roberts framework provided no heightened barriers to the admission of
“testimonial” statements. Roberts treated testimonial and nontestimonial
statements identically and, in fact, provided so few limits on the admission of
either form of hearsay that commentators ridiculed the case as largely
ineffectual.48 Roberts condoned the admission of any out-of-court statement
(testimonial or otherwise) that fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception,
or appeared trustworthy.49 Consequently, the Roberts framework adopted the

guidance is reflected above. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
45 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155; Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2007); Robert
P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: Avoiding Serious Damage to Crawford’s Limited
Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 679 (2009) (“Even though an incriminating,
unconfronted statement is offered to convict the defendant, it is not covered at all by the
Confrontation Clause unless the statement is deemed testimonial.”).
46 Crawford, 541 U.S at 51.
47 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements . . . is no better rooted in history than our
current doctrine.”); Craig M. Bradley, Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 315, 321 (2010) (asserting that “the main problem” with
“Crawford/Davis . . . is that the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction has nothing to do
with the defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses against him”); Aviva Orenstein, Sex,
Threats and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v. Bedingfield for Modern
Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 151 (2010)
(describing the dichotomy as “[s]hort on nuance and hostile to issues of policy”).
48 Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35
UCLA L. REV. 557, 558 (1988) (contending that Roberts relegated the right to confrontation
to the position of a “minor adjunct” to non-constitutional evidence law); Lininger, supra
note 3, at 756 (commenting that under Roberts, “the Confrontation Clause rarely presented
any impediment to the admission of hearsay against the accused”); Mosteller, supra note 14,
at 695-96.
49 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (holding that the prosecution can establish the
requisite reliability either by showing “particularized guarantees” of a statement’s
“trustworthiness,” or by showing that the statement falls “within a firmly rooted hearsay
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spirit, if not the letter, of Dean Wigmore’s minimalist position that nonconstitutional hearsay rules, rather than the Sixth Amendment, delineated the
limits on the prosecution’s use of hearsay at trial.50
Roberts’s failure to target testimonial hearsay meant that its framework did
nothing to prevent deliberate evasion of the defendant’s core Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examination. As long as a judge deemed the
resulting statement reliable, the prosecutor could, under Roberts, obtain out-ofcourt statements, such as affidavits or videotaped examinations, and present
them at trial in place of a live witness. Illustrating this shortcoming, Akhil
Amar posited an extreme example: a cunning prosecutor who adjourns trial
just before calling a witness, then obtains a videotaped statement from the
witness and presents the tape, in lieu of the witness, at trial.51 Clearly such
evidence should be precluded by a constitutional right to confront one’s
accusers, but Roberts did not dictate that result. In short, Roberts permitted an
“inquisitorial” system – the bane of the right to confrontation.52
While non-constitutional hearsay rules prevented a full-fledged civil law
system from taking root under Roberts, isolated inquisitorial practices did
emerge. One of the most noteworthy examples grew out of the wave of
prosecutions necessitated by the “War on Drugs.”53 In a typical drug case, the
prosecution must establish that the item in question is an illegal drug, as

exception”).
50 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1011, 1021 (1998) (highlighting the near perfect alignment of pre-Crawford
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the federal hearsay rules); Jonakait, supra note 48,
at 571-72 (explaining that, prior to Crawford, for the accused to “know the boundaries of
this part of his confrontation right, [he] should look not to constitutional interpretation, but
to evidence law”); Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable
Breakdown of a Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56
S.C. L. REV. 185, 201 (2004) (arguing that the Roberts test boiled down to “a restatement of
Dean Wigmore’s general theory of admissibility for hearsay rule exceptions, promulgated in
his 1912 treatise on evidence”). As noted in Part III.A, Roberts itself prevented some
prosecutorial abuses by requiring a showing of unavailability in the “usual case.” Roberts,
448 U.S. at 65. The Court jettisoned this requirement shortly after Roberts, however. See
infra Part III.A.
51
AMAR, supra note 28, at 129.
52 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. The Court uses the descriptive terms “civil law” and
“inquisitorial” interchangeably to refer to a system that “condones examination in private by
judicial officers,” as opposed to the “common-law tradition . . . of live testimony in court
subject to adversarial testing.” Id. at 43. For a skeptical assessment of the Court’s “antiinquisitorialism” in Crawford and elsewhere, see Sklansky, supra note 23, at 1674 (arguing,
inter alia, that the modern Court “exaggerates the importance of Continental criminal
procedure to the Founding generation”).
53 See Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 754 (2002) (describing
“America’s second war on drugs – the ongoing ban on the sale, possession and use of illegal
narcotics”).
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opposed to some innocuous substance such as baking soda or oregano.54
Under Roberts’s permissive umbrella, statutes and judicial decisions allowed
the prosecution to accomplish this with affidavits from non-testifying
Sworn affidavits, prepared by disinterested
government chemists.55
professionals, were nothing if not reliable and, consequently, Roberts did not
prevent their introduction against criminal defendants.56
As the post-Crawford Supreme Court would hold in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts and reiterate in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the prosecution’s
presentation of sworn affidavits in lieu of live testimony violates any plausible
interpretation of the defendant’s right to “be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”57 Indeed, over a century ago the Supreme Court explained that,
“[t]he primary object of the constitutional provision . . . was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness.”58
If the Supreme Court had decided Melendez-Diaz prior to Crawford, the
recent transformation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence may have looked
less like a revolution and more like a counterinsurgency. The Court could
have framed its rejection of Roberts-era case law as a simple recognition that
54

Given that statutes must go to great lengths to criminalize certain substances and not
others, the showing is not easy. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006) (criminalizing cocaine by
listing as a “Schedule II” drug, substances consisting of “coca leaves, except coca leaves
and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or
their salts have been removed; cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of
isomers; ecgonine, its derivatives” (footnote omitted)).
55 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 306 (2009); id. at 349-50 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (citing Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 139-42 (5th Cir. 1995); Minner v.
Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1313-15 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353,
1359-60 (8th Cir. 1988)). The certificates typically include the precise quantity as well. See
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308; Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305
(No. 07-591) (explaining that in that case “two state-employed analysts issued three sworn
reports on letterhead from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health” that asserted,
inter alia, “that the nineteen bags found in the police cruiser contained 22.16 grams of a
substance containing cocaine”).
56 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64 (faulting Roberts for “admit[ting] core testimonial
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude”); see also MelendezDiaz, 557 U.S. at 349-50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that “before Crawford” all
the “Federal Courts of Appeals to consider the issue agreed” that the “Sixth Amendment
does not require analysts to testify in court”); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 950
N.E.2d 867, 871 (Mass. 2011) (“It is beyond question that prior to Crawford, drug
certificates were broadly considered admissible against a criminal defendant in the absence
of the testimony of the analyst.”).
57 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310 (“There is little doubt that the documents at issue in
this case fall within the ‘core class of testimonial statements’ thus described.”); see also
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011).
58 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); see also California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
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its decisions had, perhaps unintentionally, introduced the long-spurned
Wigmorian view of the Confrontation Clause59 – permitting the prosecution to
evade even the most basic confrontation guarantee. As Crawford states, and
the facts of Melendez-Diaz demonstrate, “[l]eaving the regulation of out-ofcourt statements to the law of evidence” renders “the Confrontation Clause
powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”60
In retrospect, then, the most surprising thing about the Court’s change of
direction in Crawford is that it did not emerge sooner. As Melendez-Diaz
demonstrates, a testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy keyed to the purpose of
the speaker or interrogator61 is a necessary, even inevitable, facet of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The Clause must, above all, prohibit the
admission of out-of-court statements procured as substitutes for live-witness
testimony. If it does not, the constitutional guarantee of confrontation becomes
meaningless.
An analytical framework that identifies and excludes
“testimonial” hearsay permits this critical prioritization; its absence, as
Crawford validly proclaimed, constituted Roberts’s “unpardonable vice.”62
II.

WHAT THE COURT GOT WRONG: NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY

The preceding Part illustrates the aspect of the Crawford revolution that
must be preserved. Crawford and its progeny rightly target unconfronted,
“testimonial” statements as the primary evil prohibited by the Confrontation
Clause. This Part begins the analysis of what the Crawford-era Court gets

59

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51 (“[W]e once again reject the view that the Confrontation
Clause[’s] . . . application to out-of-court statements . . . depends upon ‘the law of Evidence
for the time being.’” (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 104 (2d ed. 1923))); Green, 399 U.S. at
155 (rejecting the contention that “the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law”). Justice Breyer discussed the disconnect between Green and Roberts in a
concurring opinion in Lilly v. Virginia: “The Court’s effort to tie the Clause so directly to
the hearsay rule is of fairly recent vintage, compare [Roberts v. Ohio] with California v.
Green.” Lily v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
60 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the Court’s cases “found implicit in the Confrontation Clause
some limitation upon hearsay evidence, since otherwise the government could subvert the
confrontation right by putting on witnesses who know nothing except what an absent
declarant said”).
61 Prior to Bryant, the Court had not resolved whose (objectively analyzed) purpose
controlled, the speaker’s or, where a statement was elicited during questioning, the
questioner’s. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1161 n.11 (2011) (noting the
“confusion” on this point). The Bryant majority held that all perspectives were relevant to
the inquiry. Id. at 1160-61. Justice Scalia disagreed, arguing that the speaker’s purpose
controls. Id. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
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wrong: its flawed rationale for that conclusion. As discussed below, the Court
missteps when it claims – as it has since Davis, the decision that immediately
followed Crawford – that, as a textual and historical matter, the Sixth
Amendment term “witnesses” itself applies only to “testimonial” statements.
This interpretive error is not a purely academic matter. If the Court’s
intolerance for testimonial hearsay stemmed from the functional intuition
discussed in Part I (a recognition that testimonial hearsay must, of course, be
barred to preserve the defendant’s core Sixth Amendment right to crossexamination), nontestimonial hearsay could still receive Confrontation Clause
scrutiny. The Court’s distinct textual claim that “witnesses” as used in the
Sixth Amendment solely addresses “testimonial” hearsay forecloses this
possibility.63 The discussion below explores the origins of the Court’s textual
and historical reasoning on this critical point and articulates its flaws.
A.

The Surprising Origins of the Testimonial-Nontestimonial Dichotomy

The Supreme Court’s equation of the term “witnesses” in the Sixth
Amendment with “testimonial” statements traces its roots to a curious source.
The core of Crawford’s analysis sprouted not from the criminal defense bar or
historical authorities, but from the United States’ amicus brief in the 1991 case
White v. Illinois.64 The amicus brief, arguing in support of the admission of a
young child’s out-of-court allegations of sexual abuse, proposed a novel
approach to interpreting the Confrontation Clause. This alternative approach
ignored the reliability of the child’s statements or her availability (the key
variables under the then-governing Roberts framework), and deemed the
statements unobjectionable because the child was not a “witness” as that term

63

If a person who makes a nontestimonial assertion is not a “witness” under the
Confrontation Clause, then the Clause is indifferent to the admission of that person’s
unconfronted assertion against the defendant. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
64 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 20, White, 502 U.S. 346 (No. 90-6113) [hereinafter White Amicus Brief]; see
also Michael R. Dreeben, Prefatory Article: The Confrontation Clause, the Law of
Unintended Consequences, and the Structure of Sixth Amendment Analysis, 34 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, v n.17 (2005). As Richard Friedman notes, Crawford’s origins
can be traced even further back, to an earlier brief filed by the United States (and thenDeputy Solicitor General Samuel Alito) in United States v. Inadi. See Richard Friedman,
The Story of Crawford, in EVIDENCE STORIES 335, at 343 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006). The
United States’ argument in Inadi, however, merely sought a hands-off approach to hearsay
admitted under traditional hearsay exceptions, while acknowledging that the Court should
more vigorously scrutinize, under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay “analogous to ex parte
affidavits and depositions.” Brief for the United States at 24-25, United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986) (No. 84-1580). It was only in White that the United States presented a
cognizable theory of the Clause that resembles (to a degree) what later emerged in
Crawford.
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was used in the Sixth Amendment.65 Fleshing out the point, the United States’
brief states: “For purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the term ‘witnesses
against’ more fittingly describes those individuals who actually provide incourt testimony or the functional equivalent – i.e., affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony or other statements (such as confessions) that are made with a view
to legal proceedings.”66
As the child’s hearsay in White v. Illinois arguably did not fit this
description, the United States contended that admission of her statements –
whether reliable or not – did not violate the Confrontation Clause.67 Although
its analysis is sparse, the United States tethered its textual interpretation to the
definition of “witness” given in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary, An American
Dictionary of the English Language.68 On this point, the United States
parroted Justice Scalia’s dissent a year earlier in Maryland v. Craig, in which
Justice Scalia relied on the same definition to disparage the majority’s
conclusion that the presentation of trial testimony via closed-circuit television
was constitutional.69
During oral argument in White, Justice Scalia criticized Roberts and seized
on the United States’ alternative interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,
proclaiming, “[m]aybe the solution lies in the word ‘witnesses.’ What
constitutes a ‘witness’? . . . [I]t may extend to nothing except witnesses in the
formal sense, somebody who appears at trial or someone who makes a
deposition or signs an affidavit in preparation for the trial.”70 The White
majority roundly rejected the United States’ alternative theory, but Justice

65

White Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 17.
Id. at 18-19.
67 Id. at 17.
68 Id. at 18 (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)). The oral argument transcript reflects that the advocates for the United
States and Illinois viewed the alternate position as a long shot. Justice Scalia voiced support
for the alternate position earlier in oral argument, but counsel for the United States began
with the contention that the case should be decided under existing law, and used most of his
time arguing that point. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, White, 502 U.S. 346 (No. 906113) (“It’s our position that the case can be decided within the framework of Inadi . . . .”).
Only after Justice Scalia asked if the United States was “abandoning” the “position that this
material is not really covered by the Confrontation Clause anyway” did the Deputy Solicitor
General discuss the alternative theory – a theory that provided the Court an opportunity to
reconsider the Roberts framework, “if it’s inclined to do so.” Id. Responding to Justice
Scalia, counsel for Illinois offered only that the State had assumed the Court would follow
Roberts, but if not, “the State of Illinois . . . would probably agree with you that there is a
question” as to whether the declarant “was actually a witness for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 22-23.
69 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 15. Justice Scalia added: “That would
make the Confrontation Clause make sense, and the States could continue to apply the
hearsay rule.” Id.
66
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Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) endorsed it in a concurring opinion as “in
some ways more consistent with the text and history of the Clause than our
current jurisprudence.”71 After White, the United States’ theory would be
nurtured by influential commentators, such as Akhil Amar and Richard
Friedman, and ultimately blossom into law thirteen years later in Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion (joined by, inter alia, Justice Thomas) in Crawford.72
Interestingly, while both Amar and Friedman adopted the basic premise of the
United States’ brief (a testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy keyed to the
statement’s purpose), neither scholar relied on Noah Webster’s dictionary
definition of the term “witness” to do so.73 In fact, while generally opining
that history supported the dichotomy, these scholars primarily emphasized the
practical imperative for any sensible confrontation right to prohibit statements
consciously elicited as a substitute for live testimony.74 As explained in Part I,

71 White, 502 U.S. at 353; id. at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas
recognized that the “approach might be difficult to apply and might develop in a manner not
entirely consistent with the crucial ‘witnesses against him’ phrase.” Id. at 364; cf. Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (pointing out that in White, the Court “considered . . .
and rejected” a proposal to “apply the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial
statements”).
72 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (citing the White concurrence and mentioning that the
concurrence was “joined by Scalia, J.”); Dreeben, supra note 64, at xv-xviii (describing the
influence of Friedman and Amar); Friedman, supra note 50, at 1013 (“[M]y approach is
similar to those advanced by Justice Clarence Thomas [in White v. Illinois,] by the United
States as amicus curiae in [that case], and by Professor Akhil Amar . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
73 See AMAR, supra note 28, at 129-30 (arguing that the Confrontation Clause requires
cross-examination of any live-witness testimony and also, to avoid undermining that
precept, any out-of-court declarant whose statement was “prepared for court use”);
Friedman, supra note 50, at 1025-26 (arguing, based on history and policy, that if out-ofcourt statements obtained to function as substitutes for testimony at trial are admissible, “the
system has provided a mechanism by which witnesses, without actually appearing at trial,
can create testimony for use there”; and stating that such statements “lie at the core of the
concern underlying the Confrontation Clause”). For another pre-Crawford argument that
reaches the same result without the historical or textual arguments, see Michael H. Graham,
The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV.
151, 192 (1978) (stating, prior to Crawford, that “courts have apparently assumed that every
hearsay statement introduced by the Government is a statement of a witness ‘against’ the
defendant” because the courts adopt a “viewpoint of [the statement’s] use at trial” and
suggesting that a “better approach” is to “judge the statement from the viewpoint of the
circumstances under which it was made”).
74 See supra note 72. The two scholars take slightly different approaches. Amar argues
that the “ordinary, everyday meaning” of “witness” only encompasses persons who testify at
trial, but he concedes that to avoid government manipulation, the term must also be read to
encompass persons whose statements are recorded in “videotapes, transcripts, depositions,
and affidavits” that were “prepared for court use.” Amar, supra note 37, at 692-94.
Friedman seeks to expand Amar’s definition to include anyone who makes a statement
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little historical or textual exegesis is required on this point; without such a rule,
an industrious prosecutor could render the confrontation right a nullity.75 As
the next Section details, however, the Supreme Court in Crawford and Davis
followed the United States’ lead and purported to find the testimonialnontestimonial distinction implicit in the term “witness” – a decision that leads
inexorably to the elimination of constitutional restrictions on nontestimonial
hearsay.
B.

The Constitutional Text: “Witnesses Against”

Echoing Justice Thomas’s concurrence (and the United States’ amicus brief)
in White, Crawford tethers its sweeping reinterpretation of the Confrontation
Clause to the Framers’ use of the term “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment.
Citing Webster’s 1828 dictionary, the Crawford majority explained that, at the
time of the Framing, the term “witnesses” would be understood to mean people
“‘who bear testimony.’”76 “Testimony,” in turn, would be understood as a
solemn declaration made with the “purpose” of establishing a fact.77 Building
from these two definitions, Crawford formulated a “core class of ‘testimonial’
statements” which it did not fully define, but hinted might be characterized as
“‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.’”78 These testimonial statements, the Court explained,
are directly contemplated by the Confrontation Clause and thus (with the
possible “sui generis” exception of dying declarations) cannot be admitted
against a criminal defendant without confrontation, that is, crossexamination.79
The statements at issue in Crawford were “testimonial,” and thus the
Crawford Court did not decide the level of constitutional scrutiny that would
apply to the admission of nontestimonial statements.80 The Supreme Court
answered this critical question in its next Confrontation Clause case, Davis v.

“with the anticipation that, in all likelihood, the statement will be presented to the factfinder
at trial.” Friedman, supra note 50, at 1039. Friedman does not explicitly draw a connection
between this interpretation of “witness” and constitutional text or history, although he does
find general support in both sources for his approach. Id. at 1022-26.
75 See supra Part I.B.
76 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 68); see also Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
77 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
78 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410)).
79 Id. at 56 n.6, 61.
The United States’ brief in White likely did not intend that
“testimonial” statements be so strictly limited, so Crawford deviates from the United States’
position in that respect.
80 Id. at 61.
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Washington.81 The essentially unanimous Court in Davis82 reiterated its
reliance on Webster’s dictionary, but now explained that the term “witnesses”
as used in the Sixth Amendment was not only primarily directed at
“testimonial” statements, but would have been understood at the Framing to be
limited to this type of evidence.83 The Court (obtusely) proclaimed: “A
limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must
fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”84 Although
some lower courts initially missed its import,85 this statement announced that
nontestimonial statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all
and, consequently, could be admitted against a criminal defendant without
limitation. The Court eliminated any ambiguity arising from its subtle
phrasing eight months later in Whorton v. Bockting, stating “[u]nder
Crawford, . . . the Confrontation Clause has no application to [nontestimonial]
statements.”86
The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment term
“witnesses” encompasses only “testimonial” statements gives rise to what may
prove to be the most significant implication of the new Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence – the elimination of constitutional restrictions on the admission
of nontestimonial hearsay.87 This development has become increasingly
81

Davis, 547 U.S. at 823.
Only Justice Thomas did not join the majority opinion in Davis, and his disagreement
was that the Court’s definition of “witnesses” was too broad, not too narrow. Id. at 835
(Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting). Thus, the Justices were unanimous in deciding that
the Confrontation Clause does not limit nontestimonial hearsay.
83 Id. at 824 (majority opinion).
84 Id.; see also id. at 821 (“Only [testimonial statements] cause the declarant to be a
‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. . . . It is the testimonial character
of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional
limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”); Josephine
Ross, Crawford’s Short-Lived Revolution: How Davis v. Washington Reins in Crawford’s
Reach, 83 N.D. L. REV. 387, 411 (2007) (critiquing Davis for “almost casually”
extinguishing the broader scope of the confrontation right suggested in Crawford). Bryant
glosses over Davis’s role in this evolution, suggesting erroneously that Crawford, not Davis,
“limited the Confrontation Clause’s reach to testimonial statements.” Michigan v. Bryant,
131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011). The Court makes this same error in Bockting. See Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis, and Bockting, 19 REGENT U.
L. REV. 367, 370 n.15 (2007). Friedman appears to agree with the Court’s treatment of
nontestimonial hearsay. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 1032 (“If the statement is not a
testimonial one, then the declarant should not be deemed to have been acting as a witness in
making it, and so the Clause should not apply – whether the declarant is available or not.”).
85 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 369 n.11 (citing cases).
86 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2007).
87 See Davies, supra note 15, at 468 n.291; Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 370; Lininger,
supra note 15, at 405 (“[O]ne of Crawford’s greatest shortcomings is its failure to specify
confrontation requirements for nontestimonial hearsay.”); Lininger, supra note 3, at 767
(referencing a survey of post-Crawford court opinions that found that a substantial portion
82
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important as the Court steadily narrows the definition of “testimonial” and,
correspondingly, expands the category of nontestimonial hearsay.88
As critics would quickly point out, the Court’s textual analysis is seriously
flawed.89 Even accepting the Court’s method of constitutional exegesis, the
definition of “witness” upon which Davis grounded its analysis is only one of
five provided in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary.90 The Supreme Court in
Crawford and then Davis inexplicably chose the fifth of Webster’s definitions,
ignoring other potentially applicable definitions such as the third definition: “A
person who knows or sees any thing; one personally present; as, he was
witness; he was an eye-witness.”91 As Randolph Jonakait explains:
Those who bear testimony might be the people referred to as witnesses in
the Confrontation Clause, but so too might be those who know something
about a relevant event from their personal presence. If, as in [one of]
Webster’s [explanatory] example[s], one who saw the ratification
ceremonies was a witness, then one who saw a shooting is also a
witness.92
Although neither Crawford nor the subsequent case law provides an
explanation for the Court’s rejection of Webster’s third definition, an
explanation appears in Justice Scalia’s pre-Crawford dissent in Maryland v.
Craig.93 There, while critiquing a different facet of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia recognized that Webster’s third definition “would
cover hearsay evidence,” but dismissed it as “excluded in the Sixth
Amendment by the words following the noun: ‘witnesses against him.’”94
of evidence called into question under Crawford was ultimately ruled admissible because it
was nontestimonial).
88 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (suggesting that “testimonial” does not reach statements
unless they were made or elicited “to create a record for trial” or for the purpose of “creating
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”); cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford’s
Confrontation Right in a Digital Age, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33 (2012) (highlighting the
possibility of a future where litigation depends to a great deal on nontestimonial, electronic
evidence broadcast in text messages and on social media sites).
89 See Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v.
Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 157 (2006).
90 WEBSTER, supra note 68.
91 Jonakait, supra note 89, at 159 (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 68); Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 Jonakait, supra note 89, at 159-61, 159 nn.26-27.
93 Craig, 497 U.S. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). It is unclear why Justice Scalia did not rely on
another Framing-era dictionary, which provides only one pertinent definition of “witness”
and supports Justice Scalia’s position much more powerfully: “One who gives testimony.”
2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755); cf. Samuel A.
Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 234 (1999) (discussing various
Framing-era dictionaries). In fact, as discussed in the text, Webster’s dictionary provides
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According to Justice Scalia (in Craig), the inclusion of the phrase “against
him” demonstrated that the term “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment
“obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial.”95
Justice Scalia provided no further analysis to support his conclusion,96 and has
not reintroduced the argument in his more recent Confrontation Clause
opinions.
Justice Scalia’s silence on this point in Davis and Crawford suggests that he
has abandoned the argument that the textual phrase “against him” establishes
the inapplicability of Webster’s third definition of “witness”; the argument
likely impugns his current view (disputed by Justice Thomas) that even
relatively informal hearsay statements – such as those at issue in Bryant – can
qualify as “testimonial.”97 It is nevertheless worth noting that Justice Scalia’s
conclusion in Craig is far from “obvious[].”98 For one thing, many state
constitutions at the time of the Framing guaranteed the right of the accused to
confront “the witnesses” without the accompanying phrase “against him.”99
Absent some evidence that the Framers sought to create a narrower federal
confrontation right than existed in states like Virginia and Pennsylvania, these
parallel constitutional provisions suggest that the phrase “against him” was
the most powerful evidence that the Johnson definition was not the only one in use at the
time of the Framing. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
95 Craig, 497 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)); White Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 18 n.8 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 864-65
(Scalia, J. dissenting)).
96 Craig considered limits on the defendant’s ability to physically confront a child
witness who testified via closed-circuit television. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840-41. Since the
child witness actually testified, there was no question that she was a “witness” under the
Sixth Amendment. Id.
97 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The argument that Justice Scalia made in
Craig and at oral argument in White, see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 13,
resonates with Justice Thomas’s position that only formal affidavits and the like trigger the
Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Scalia now disagrees with Justice Thomas on this point
and consequently may have consciously abandoned the Craig argument to avoid conceding
the point. Compare id. at 830 n.5 (majority opinion), with id. at 836 (Thomas, J., concurring
and dissenting) (repeatedly citing the White concurrence, which Justice Scalia joined, for the
proposition that only formal, out-of-court statements implicate the Confrontation Clause).
98 Craig, 497 U.S. at 865.
99 For pertinent state constitutional provisions, see WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1397, at
155-58 n.1. The Virginia Constitution drafted largely by George Mason guarantees the
defendant’s right “to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses”; the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides a similar right “to be confronted with the witnesses.” See Graham
Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 21012 & n.18 (1984) (“The language of the confrontation clause apparently originated in a like
provision contained in Article 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights . . . .”); Daniel Pollitt,
The Right of Confrontation, Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 398 (1959).
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inserted either for clarity or rhetorical effect, rather than, as Justice Scalia
suggested in Craig, to narrow the right’s scope.
With respect to clarity, the most logical explanation for the drafters’
inclusion of the phrase “against him” in the Sixth Amendment is the separation
of the broad category of “witnesses” – i.e., people who perceived relevant
information, but play no role in a criminal proceeding – from the much smaller
category of “witnesses against” who contribute to the prosecution’s case. Only
this latter category, consisting of persons whose testimony or out-of-court
statements are introduced in the prosecution’s case, triggers the confrontation
right. On this reading, the phrase “against him” does not limit the Sixth
Amendment command to statements of persons who formally “give
testimony,” but rather clarifies that the prosecution has no obligation to
confront the defendant with every person possessing relevant information
about a crime.100
In terms of rhetoric, the phrase “witnesses against him” creates an elegant
contrast in the Sixth Amendment to the immediately following right to
“compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”101 One could
imagine the snickering among the Constitution’s masterful draftsmen if the
proposed amendment omitted this contrast and blandly stated that the
defendant had the right “to be confronted with the witnesses; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.”102
As the preceding discussion suggests, neither Justice Scalia’s unsupported
assertions for the Court in Crawford and Davis, nor his earlier argument in his
dissent in Craig, explain why, as a matter of textual interpretation, the term
“witnesses” should be limited to persons who “bear testimony.”103 To the
extent these efforts to narrowly define “witnesses” accomplish anything, it is to
100

This interpretation answers Amar’s contention that the term “witness” in the
Confrontation Clause cannot mean “a person who sees an underlying out-of-court event.”
Amar, supra note 37, at 695 n.212. Amar argues that such an interpretation is facially
absurd because it would capture persons who “never declare[] anything, in court or out” as
well as persons who do make statements but whose statements “are never alluded to at
trial.” Id. (“[T]he government need not somehow bring [these witnesses] face to face with
the defendant.”). As explained previously, these persons may indeed be covered by the term
“witnesses” but are then unequivocally excluded by the addition of the phrase “against
him.” See supra text accompanying note 94; cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (emphasizing, in rejecting a claim that the government violated the
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by deporting percipient witnesses, that “the
Sixth Amendment does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the
attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses: it guarantees him ‘compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI)).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the defendant’s right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”).
102 Id. (emphasis added) (omitting the words “against him” and “in his favor”).
103 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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needlessly obscure a straightforward term. Prior to Justice Scalia’s cogitations
in Crawford, there was never any suggestion that the phrase “witnesses against
him” possessed a mysterious meaning only discernible to eighteenth-century
English speakers. As Justice Scalia himself emphasized for a majority of the
Court in a recent case, the “‘Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.’”104 And indeed, as Noah Webster’s
dictionary reveals, and Justice Scalia actually acknowledged in Craig, the
“normal and ordinary” meaning of the Confrontation Clause text was the same
“in 1791 as today.”105 The term “witness” is a flexible one that encompasses
both Noah Webster’s third and fifth definitions. A “witness” is, in common
usage, both a person who testifies at trial and a person with personal
knowledge of something relevant to a criminal case. Thus, there is no reason,
based on the text, to eliminate either category from the Confrontation Clause’s
scope.
The Sixth Amendment phrase “witnesses against” can most
comfortably be read to encompass both the narrow meaning adopted by the
modern Court and, whenever an out-of-court speaker’s hearsay is used at trial,
the broader meaning implicitly accepted in pre-Crawford jurisprudence.106
That a person becomes a “witness against” the defendant whenever the
prosecution relies on her out-of-court statements as substantive evidence is
perhaps best illustrated by the absurdity of the Court’s contrary contention as
applied in cases such as Davis and Bryant. The prosecution’s case in Bryant
rested almost entirely on the out-of-court statement of the deceased victim,
Anthony Covington, identifying Bryant as his killer.107 The government’s
other evidence suggested only that the shooting occurred outside a house
where Bryant lived, and that the victim purchased drugs from Bryant on prior
occasions.108 The jury’s assessment of the credibility of Covington’s
unconfronted statement determined Bryant’s fate. In fact, during a pretrial
hearing on the statement’s admissibility, the prosecutor warned that if the trial

104

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
105 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106 A conclusion that the Sixth Amendment phrase “witnesses against” applies to all
speakers whose hearsay statements are offered by the prosecution is by no means radical. In
fact, the conclusion echoes pre-Crawford precedent – a body of case law that spans a
century. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 1030 (explaining that under pre-Crawford
doctrine, “the declarant of any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it
asserts is treated as a ‘witness’ for purposes of confrontation”); cf. Bradley, supra note 47, at
316, 323 (“[I]t seems obvious . . . that everyone who testifies for the prosecution, whether
offering live or hearsay testimony, is a ‘witness’ against the defendant under the terms of the
Sixth Amendment”).
107 People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009).
108 Id. at 66-67. Bryant’s girlfriend testified that Bryant was not home at the time of the
shooting. Id. Bryant’s first trial ended in a hung jury. Id.
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court excluded the statement, “we won’t have a trial.”109 In his opening
remarks, the prosecutor told the jury that Covington’s statement was “[t]he
most important piece of evidence you’ll hear during this trial” and urged the
jurors to view the statement as the victim “speaking to you from the grave and
telling you what happened . . . and telling you who’s responsible.”110
Whatever one thinks of Bryant’s likely guilt (or the desirability of admitting
Covington’s statement), it requires a true contortion of language to conclude
that Covington was not one of the “witnesses against” Bryant. Indeed, it
would be more accurate, in light of the trial record, to say that Covington was
the only witness against him. As the prosecutor readily admitted, without
Covington’s out-of-court statement, the case would have been dismissed.111
Although there may be a temptation to attribute the Court’s strained textual
analysis in Bryant to the lack of fidelity to Crawford bemoaned by Justice
Scalia,112 a similar contortion of the constitutional text appears in Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in Davis. Typical of domestic violence cases,113 the
prosecution’s case in Davis consisted of live testimony from police officers
who did not observe the alleged assault.114 Only the victim’s answers to
questions during a frantic (reverse) 911 call connected Davis to the offense.115
In closing argument, defense counsel stressed this weakness, highlighting the
absence of any eyewitness testimony to the assault.116 In response, the
prosecutor relied on the victim’s out-of-court statements to fill the void:
“[T]here was a person present [during the crime] . . . and although she is
not here today to talk to you[,] she left you something better. She left you
her testimony on the day that this happened[;] . . . this shows that the

109

Id. at 76.
Id. (quoting the prosecutor).
111 Id.
112 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1171 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending
that under Crawford, “this is an absurdly easy case,” yet reaching the opposite conclusion of
the majority).
113 Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay
Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out-of-Court Statements As Substantive
Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (2002) (explaining that “[n]on-cooperation by
recantation or failure to appear at trial is an epidemic in domestic violence cases” and
reporting estimates by domestic violence practitioners of eighty to ninety percent
noncooperation); Orenstein, supra note 47, at 144; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies
and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 328 (2005).
114 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818 (2006).
115 See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005) (“The only evidence linking
Davis to her injuries was the tape recording of the 911 call.”)
116 Brief for Petitioner at 8, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-5224); Ross, supra note 17, at
199.
110
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defendant, Adrian Davis was at her home and assaulted her. It is right
here in her voice.”117
Despite the prosecutor’s vivid rhetoric that the victim’s 911 call constituted her
“testimony on the day that this happened,” the Supreme Court ruled that the
victim was not a “witness against” Davis.118 Again, this conclusion ignores the
“normal and ordinary” meaning of the pertinent terms. The victim was, after
all, the only person who linked Davis to the crime; without the recording of her
“testimony on the day that this happened,” the prosecution had no case.
C.

The Confronation Right at the Time of the Framing

The Davis opinion does not solely rely on Webster’s dictionary for its
conclusion that out-of-court speakers whose nontestimonial statements are
introduced at trial are not “witnesses” under the Sixth Amendment. Davis
reinforces its textual argument with a historical one.119 In the sentence
immediately following the groundbreaking (if obtuse) core-perimeter statement
quoted above, the Court adds: “We are not aware of any early American case
invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation
that did not clearly involve [testimonial statements].”120 The Court thus
buttresses its textual argument with a historical claim: courts in the Framing
era understood that only testimonial hearsay implicated the confrontation right.
Unfortunately for the Davis Court, the historical argument fares no better
than the textual one. First, there is at least one early American case that the
Court overlooks: the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr.121 Presiding over Burr’s trial,
Chief Justice John Marshall deemed out-of-court statements of an alleged
coconspirator inadmissible because the testimony was unconfronted, even
though those statements appear to fall neatly into the nontestimonial
category.122 Second, there is an explanation, other than a shared understanding

117

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 8 (quoting the prosecutor); see also Ross,
supra note 17, at 199.
118 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
119 Id. at 824.
120 Id.
121 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
122 Id. at 193; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 228 (2005) (commenting that Crawford
“completely ignored” this case); Roger W. Kirst, Confrontation Rules After Davis v.
Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 635, 680 (2007) (criticizing Davis’s statement because “it is
not a true statement about history” and citing the case of Aaron Burr where “Chief Justice
Marshall sitting as a Circuit Justice excluded evidence of private conversations that were
offered as co-conspirator statements”). The majority and dissent in Crawford sparred over
the significance of Burr, which makes its absence from the discussion in Davis particularly
difficult to understand. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004); id. at 71
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Another case the Court might have
considered on this point is King v. Brasier where a defendant was ruled improperly
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of the confrontation right’s inapplicability, that fully explains the dearth of
Framing-era American cases excluding nontestimonial statements: a widely
accepted contemporaneous understanding that nontestimonial hearsay could
not be used in criminal cases.
Although disagreement on this point can be found,123 recent historical
scholarship makes a compelling case that that at the time of the Framing,
criminal courts consistently recognized only two hearsay exceptions: (1) an
exception for sworn witness statements of unavailable witnesses taken
pursuant to so-called Marian statutes (statements that were obviously
“testimonial”); and (2) an exception for dying declarations (statements the
post-Crawford opinions remove from the analytical framework as “sui
generis”).124 Historical sources suggest that all other hearsay, including
statements that the Davis majority would consider “nontestimonial” (for
example, excited utterances), was generally regarded as inadmissible to prove
a defendant’s guilt.125

convicted based on a child’s statements to her mother. King v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng.
Rep. 202 (K.B.) 202; 1 Leach 199, 200. The Davis Court suggests Brasier involved
“testimonial” hearsay, Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, although the statements are certainly not
“clearly” testimonial, particularly in light of the Court’s recent interpretation of that term in
Bryant. Admittedly, Brasier is an English case, but given the Supreme Court’s reliance on
English cases throughout its modern confrontation jurisprudence, it seems questionable for
the Court to suddenly invoke the distinction here.
123 For example, Michael Polelle argues that “res gestae statements were used as hearsay
exceptions against criminal defendants before and at the time of the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment.” Michael Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford
World, 71 MO. L. REV. 285, 293 (2006). To support his contention, Polelle cites three cases:
Thompson v. Trevanion, King v. Gordon, and The Trial of John Horne Tooke. Id. at 292-94,
293 n.43. Trevanion was a civil case, something Polelle recognizes. Id. at 292 n.39;
Thompson v. Trevanion, (1693) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.) 179; Skin 402; see also Davies,
supra note 15, at 452 (arguing, as well, that “framing-era Americans . . . were unlikely to
have thought [Thompson] was authority for a spontaneous declaration or res gestae hearsay
exception”). King v. Gordon provides virtually no support as it appears to involve a very
subtle manner of hearsay: repeated testimony, without apparent objection, that unknown
members of an anti-Catholic mob sweeping through London cried out on various occasions,
“‘No Popery’” and wore “blue cockades.” See King v. Gordon, (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 372
(K.B.) 374; 21 How. St. Tr. 485. Tooke is similarly unenlightening in that the case report
merely includes defense counsel’s reference to a letter admitted, without objection, on the
ground that it was “an answer to an act which is charged against the prisoner” and so was
“part of the res gesta.” The Trial of John Horne Tooke, (1794) 25 How. St. Tr. 1, 440.
124 Davies, supra note 15, at 417-18; cf. R. v Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352
(K.B.) 353; 1 Leach 500, 503 (recognizing these “two . . . species” of admissible hearsay).
For a summary of Marian statutes, see Davies, supra note 15, at 397-98 n.116, and Robert
Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK.
L. REV. 493, 498 (2007).
125 Davies, supra note 15, at 351, 452 (arguing that “framing-era evidence doctrine
imposed a virtually total ban against using unsworn hearsay evidence to prove a criminal
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Chief Justice Marshall’s remarks in the Aaron Burr trial support the notion
that the Framers would have considered unconfronted, nontestimonial hearsay
to be self-evidently inadmissible. Excluding nontestimonial statements offered
against Burr, the Chief Justice invoked the “rule of evidence which rejects
mere hearsay testimony.”126 Marshall thought the rule’s wisdom obvious:
I know not why a declaration in court should be unavailing, unless made
upon oath, if a declaration out of court was to criminate others than him
who made it; nor why a man should have a constitutional claim to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations,
made in his absence, may be evidence against him.127
Other historical sources are in accord. The 1769 edition of Gilbert’s treatise
(cited by Justice Rehnquist in his Crawford concurrence) states:
“Hearsay is no Evidence . . . though a Person Testify what he hath heard
upon Oath, yet the Person who spake it was not upon Oath; . . . if the first
Speech was without Oath, an Oath that there was such a Speech makes it
no more than a bare speaking, and so of no Value in a Court of Justice,
where all Things were determined under the Solemnities of an
Oath . . . .”128
Similar sentiments appear in William Hawkins’s influential Framing-era
treatise, which emphasized that the defendant “hath no Opportunity of a cross
Blackstone’s 1771
Examination” when hearsay is introduced.129
Commentaries on the Laws of England states succinctly: “[N]o evidence of a
discourse with another will be admitted, but the man himself must be
produced.”130

defendant’s guilt,” and most modern hearsay exceptions “had not yet been invented when
the Bill of Rights was framed”); John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17
HARV. L. REV. 437, 456-57 (1904) (stating that from the beginning of the eighteenth
century, “the writers upon the law assume[d]” that the prohibition on the introduction of
out-of-court statements was “a settled doctrine,” based on the rationale that “statements used
as testimony must be made where the maker can be subjected to cross-examination”). For a
discussion of historical support for a business records exception, see infra Part III.C.
126 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 193.
127 Id. (emphasis added).
128 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 70 n.2 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment) (quoting SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 152 (3d ed., London,
W. Owen 1769)).
129 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429-31 (4th ed.,
London, E. Richardson & C. Lintot 1762) (stating, under the heading, “How far Hearsay is
Evidence,” that “what a Stranger has been heard to say is in Strictness no Manner of
Evidence either for or against a Prisoner, not only because it is not upon Oath, but also
because the other Side hath no Opportunity of a cross Examination; and therefore it seems a
settled Rule, That it shall never be made use of but only by way of Inducement or
Illustration of what is properly Evidence”).
130 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 368 (4th ed.,
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The relevant historical sources referenced, in part, above and exhaustively
chronicled elsewhere by Thomas Davies131 support a key underlying point: the
Supreme Court drew precisely the wrong conclusion from the historical record.
The more convincing explanation for the relative absence of early American
decisions excluding nontestimonial hearsay is that there existed, at the time of
the Framing, a widespread and largely “settled Rule”132 that unsworn, out-ofcourt remarks (Justice Marshall’s “mere verbal declarations”) could not be
used to convict a criminal defendant.133 Such a rule would explain the absence
of Framing-era cases excluding or admitting nontestimonial hearsay; if a rule is
widely settled, it will rarely need to be invoked, particularly in the sparse
published records of Framing-era litigation.
It is curious, after all, that the Davis Court framed its historical contention in
terms of the absence of cases excluding nontestimonial hearsay.134 Clearly the
strongest type of historical evidence for its supposition that nontestimonial
hearsay was admissible in the Framing-era would have been a citation to a
single case admitting such evidence. Contrary to the Court’s supposition, the
historical sources discussed above suggest that such a case would go against
the prevailing understanding of the confrontation right and the Davis Court’s
failure to identify even one such case is, consequently, quite telling.135
The contention that hearsay was generally inadmissible in criminal trials of
the Framing era should not be overstated. Judicial records of the time period
are uneven and incomplete, and even the sources noted above recognize areas
Dublin, John Exshaw et al. 1771). Blackstone notes some narrow exceptions that do not
appear to contradict the general point: “yet in some cases (as in proof of any general
customs, or matters of common tradition or repute) the courts admit of hearsay evidence, or
an account of what persons deceased have declared in their life-time: but such evidence will
not be received of any particular facts.” Id.
131 See generally Davies, supra note 15.
132 HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 431; Wigmore, supra note 125, at 456-57.
133 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 219-20 (1942) (explaining that “[b]y the end of the third
decade of the eighteenth century,” hearsay “was generally rejected”); WIGMORE, supra note
31, § 1364, at 26 (explaining that as of the end of the seventeenth century “the applicability
of the hearsay rule to sworn statements in general, as well as to unsworn statements, is not
questioned” and “[f]rom the beginning of the 1700s the writers upon the law assume it as a
settled doctrine” based upon the justification that: “statements used as testimony must be
made where the maker can be subjected to cross-examination”); Davies, supra note 15, at
380-81.
134 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835-36 (2006).
135 See Davies, supra note 15, at 377, 452 (explaining that Thompson v. Trevanion did
not appear to support a contrary position, and stating that “no brief or opinion in Davis or
Crawford identified even a single published framing-era case report that actually admitted
an unsworn out-of-court statement that might now be described as ‘nontestimonial
hearsay’”); Jonakait, supra note 122, at 228-29; Kirst, supra note 122, at 680 (arguing that
the lack of cases noted in Davis might reflect that “there was no occasion to use the
doctrine, or [that] those who might have used the doctrine were not the ones who knew
about it”).

1892

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1865

of gray.136 Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall suggests that jurists in the Framing
era disagreed on the contours of the hearsay prohibition.137 In the same
opinion quoted above, he acknowledged that “some exceptions” to the general
rule prohibiting hearsay “have been introduced, concerning the extent of which
a difference of opinion prevails.”138 Further, there is only so much that one
can conclude about the nuances of hearsay doctrine from the abstract
exhortations of treatise writers and a relative absence of pertinent caselaw. As
Justice Rehnquist argued in his Crawford concurrence, one of the primary
characteristics of Framing-era evidence rules is their opacity.139 The rules
were different in different courts, constantly evolving, and muddied by a
pervasive insistence on the existence of a second-class category of (generally
unsworn) quasi-evidence that could be admitted, but “use[d]” only as an
“Inducement or Illustration of what is properly Evidence.”140
The subtle inconsistencies and general messiness of the Framing-era
historical record does not redeem the Davis Court, however. The Court (which
is surprisingly unanimous on this point) does not contend that the historical
record is uneven, difficult to interpret, or opaque.141 A candid conclusion
along those lines would permit a much more nuanced approach to
nontestimonial hearsay – an approach the Davis Court rejected out of hand.
136 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); Davies,
supra note 15, at 424, 444, 447; John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of
Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1172, 1190 (1996)
(arguing that “the law of evidence,” including the hearsay rules, “hardened only in the last
decades of the eighteenth century”); David Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 5 (emphasizing that hearsay doctrine in the eighteenth century was “less developed”
than its modern-day counterpart). Brasier provides an example of a case where a trial court
permitted hearsay in a criminal case (and was then reversed on appeal), possibly revealing
weakness in the common law hearsay prohibition. See supra note 122.
137 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 193.
138 Id. Justice Marshall cautioned “courts to be watchful of every inroad” into the “truly
important” principle prohibiting unsworn evidence. Id.
139 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 72 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Fisher, supra note 17, at 594 (recognizing uncertainty in determining
evidence rules at the time of the Framing in “light of the scant reporting style of early
English cases and courts’ general hostility at the time to admitting any hearsay evidence
whatsoever”); Langbein, supra note 136 at 1180-81; cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Under the common law, although the courts
were far from consistent, out-of-court statements made by someone other than the accused
and not taken under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or affidavits, were generally not
considered substantive evidence upon which a conviction could be based.”).
140 HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 431; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70-72 & n.1
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1367 at 19-20
(discussing a line of doctrine that ran parallel to the “general rule of exclusion” that “a
hearsay statement may be used as confirmatory or corroboratory of other testimony,” that
died out by the end of the 1700s).
141 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 824 (2006); see also supra note 82.
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Rather, the Court concluded that the historical record reflects a broad Framingera consensus that nontestimonial hearsay was admissible.142 On this point, the
Supreme Court is simply wrong. If, in fact, there was a consensus expressed at
the time of the Framing, it was that unsworn hearsay, including nontestimonial
hearsay, was generally inadmissible (not admissible) against criminal
defendants.
D.

Summary

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s arguments in Davis, the Sixth Amendment
text does not compel a conclusion that nontestimonial statements fall outside
the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Under a straightforward textual
reading, the phrase “witnesses against” encompasses all persons whose hearsay
statements (testimonial or not) are relied on by the prosecution to prove a
defendant’s guilt. This conclusion holds whether the Sixth Amendment text is
interpreted in light of common sense, historical sources, or, as the Court
prefers, through the prism of Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary. While the
Framers likely viewed the introduction of unconfronted, testimonial statements
as most alarming, the available evidence suggests they also feared the
admission of unconfronted, nontestimonial statements.143 Consequently, the
Confrontation Clause must be interpreted to apply not solely to “testimonial”
hearsay, but to “nontestimonial” hearsay as well. The balance of this Article
explores how best to incorporate constitutional limits on the admission of
nontestimonial hearsay into the Court’s jurisprudence.
III. REPAIRING THE DOCTRINE: LIMITING THE ADMISSION OF
NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
The preceding Parts map out two distinct aspects of Crawford-era
Confrontation Clause doctrine: one aspect of the caselaw that significantly
improves Roberts-era jurisprudence and another aspect that remains
powerfully flawed. This Part sketches a reform proposal intended to preserve
what is right in the new doctrine while repairing what is wrong. Importantly,
while the proposal flows naturally from the historical and textual analysis
discussed in Parts I and II, it is not justified on this ground alone. Indeed, as
the foregoing analysis suggests, neither the history nor text of the Sixth
Amendment dictates any single approach to regulating nontestimonial hearsay
– a concession the Supreme Court (and even Justices Thomas and Scalia)
142

Davis, 547 U.S. at 824.
Cf. Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 383 (“Thus while the historical record supports the
conclusion that the Framers had a heightened concern about testimonial hearsay, it does not
support a conclusion that the Framers neither had nor would have had concerns about other
forms of hearsay.”); Mosteller, supra note 14, at 721 (“[I]t is unclear how the Framers
would have reacted to a modern world where, as Rehnquist noted, hearsay is much more
admissible and ordinarily given weight that likely would have appeared foreign to the
Framers.”).
143
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willingly made prior to Crawford.144 Rather, the proposal (like the historical
and textual analysis itself) stems from the two underlying principles that most
clearly animate the confrontation right, only one of which is currently captured
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
The Court’s primary revision of Roberts-era doctrine – its insistence that
out-of-court statements made with an eye toward litigation cannot be admitted
absent confrontation – represents an essential manifestation of one of the two
key principles underlying the confrontation right. The government cannot
consciously avoid cross-examination of its witnesses by procuring admissible,
out-of-court substitutes for their testimony.145 The key conceptual flaw in the
Court’s jurisprudence is its failure to recognize the second overarching
confrontation principle: a preference for live-witness testimony, as opposed to
hearsay, that applies regardless of the origins of any particular hearsay
statement.146 Critically, this flaw appears to arise not from any reasoned
disagreement with the second principle itself, but as collateral damage from the
Court’s abrupt jurisprudential shift away from Roberts,147 and the erroneous
historical and textual analysis detailed in Part II.
As discussed below, the Supreme Court’s seemingly unconsidered retreat
from a broad preference for live testimony can be remedied fairly easily. The
Court need only reintroduce, as a limit on nontestimonial hearsay, the feature
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that once prominently enforced a
preference for live testimony – an “unavailability” requirement. Doing so
would address the Court’s inexcusable neglect of nontestimonial hearsay and,
at the same time, strengthen the underlying rationale for – and coherence of –
modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
A.

An Unavailability Requirement’s Remarkable Pedigree

The notion that the Sixth Amendment embodies the Framers’ broad
preference for live testimony is fairly uncontroversial. The idea can be found
144 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988).
Coy relies on Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in California v. Green, in which he states: “[T]he Confrontation Clause comes
to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the intended
scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, echoed
Justice Harlan’s sentiment in his concurrence in White. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is virtually no evidence of what the drafters of
the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”); cf. Peter Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV.
567, 568 (1978) (“[P]erhaps the most that should ever be expected from constitutional
history is some guidance in narrowing the range of potential meanings.”).
145 See supra Part I.B.
146 See infra Part III.A.
147 Roberts was a case that underscored the constitutional “preference” for live
testimony. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (“[T]he Clause reflects a preference for
face-to-face confrontation at trial.”).
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in the arguments of Confrontation Clause scholars,148 in the common law
authorities that informed the Framers’ conceptions of the confrontation
right,149 and throughout pre-Crawford jurisprudence.150 Traditionally, the
preference manifests as an unavailability requirement: if the prosecution seeks
to introduce a hearsay statement, the prosecutor must, at a minimum,
demonstrate that the declarant is not available to testify in person.
An unavailability requirement, as described above, is quite familiar to
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.151 For example, the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction in the 1968 case of Barber v. Page because the
prosecution failed to make “a good-faith effort” to obtain the live testimony of
a witness whose preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury.152
Emphasizing the importance of a showing of unavailability, even when the
admission of an out-of-court statement seems otherwise sensible, the Court
criticized the prosecution’s failure “to seek [the witness’s] presence” and
stirringly declared that “[t]he right of confrontation may not be dispensed with
so lightly.”153 Barber cites an earlier case where the Court went so far as to

148

Friedman, supra note 3, at 243 (“[T]he whole point of the confrontation right is to
bring testimony to trial.”); Jonakait, supra note 48, at 580 (describing “the confrontation
clause’s . . . goal . . . of preserving personal examination in front of the jury so that the
jurors can judge the believability of the witness”); Lilly, supra note 99, at 215.
149 See, e.g., West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904) (stressing that the common law
permitted certain hearsay depositions to be read, but only after it was shown “that the
witness was at the time of the trial dead, insane, too ill ever to be expected to attend the trial,
or kept away by the connivance of the defendant”); Lilly, supra note 99, at 212 (pointing out
that “[a]lmost all of the eighteenth century American and English cases collected by
Wigmore imposed on the government a stringent obligation to produce the declarant”);
Wigmore, supra note 125, at 456-57.
150 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (“[O]ur precedents establish that ‘the
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a
preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; Mattox v.
United State, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895))); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); United
States v. Dowdell, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (recognizing as the “general rule of law
embodied in the Constitution” an intent “to secure the right of the accused to meet the
witnesses face to face”). The European Court of Human Rights has set forth as one of two
minimum “requirements” for admission of hearsay against a criminal defendant that “there
must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness.” Al-Khawaja & Tahery v.
United Kingdom, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 807, 809 (2012).
151 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 (1986) (characterizing Roberts as part
of “a long line of Confrontation Clause cases involving prior testimony” that held “that
before such statements can be admitted the government must demonstrate that the declarant
is unavailable”).
152 Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25.
153 Id. at 725.
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reject the requisite showing of unavailability because the witness only became
unavailable through “the negligence of the prosecution.”154
Because the pre-Crawford Supreme Court cases applying an unavailability
requirement consistently concerned one particular type of hearsay – testimony
in a prior proceeding – it is not clear how broadly the Court viewed this
requirement. Searching for a theme in the Supreme Court precedents,
however, Justice Harlan concluded in 1970 that “the availability of the
witness” was the “uppermost consideration” in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.155 Synthesizing prior caselaw, the Court’s opinion ten years
later in Roberts followed suit, highlighting unavailability as a threshold
Confrontation Clause requirement.156 Roberts explained that the Confrontation
Clause’s “preference for face-to-face accusation, . . . establishes a rule of
necessity,” which requires that in the “usual case,” the “prosecution must either
produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant.”157 For a brief time under Roberts, at least
in the “usual case,” only after the prosecution met its burden of demonstrating
unavailability could a judicial determination of reliability stand in for the
constitutional requirement of confrontation.158
The broad unavailability principle announced in Roberts faded quickly. Six
years after Roberts, the Supreme Court in United States v. Inadi endorsed the
introduction of a coconspirator’s hearsay statement despite the apparent
154

Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900).
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 183 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf.
Imwinkelried, supra note 40, at 532-36 (discussing the “checkered history” of an
unavailability requirement in the Supreme Court’s late twentieth-century decisions); Laird
C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional
Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 670 (1986) (recognizing that “[t]he
requirement of showing unavailability or producing the hearsay declarant for crossexamination at trial has been a recurring theme in two lines of Supreme Court decisions
extending back to the nineteenth century,” but stipulating that the cases primarily deal with
prior testimony and so “do not provide authority for the sweeping unavailability requirement
set forth in Roberts”).
156 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (explaining that a “general approach to the
problem is discernible” from the Court’s prior opinions and attempting to outline that
approach).
157 Id.; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Our Confrontation Clause conditions for the admission of hearsay have long included a
‘general requirement of unavailability’ of the declarant.”).
158 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (“The second [reliability] aspect operates once a witness
is shown to be unavailable.”); Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1984)
(“A hearsay statement is admissible for purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if the
declarant is unavailable and the hearsay statement appears reliable.” (citing Roberts, 448
U.S. 56)). In addition to its explicit reference to the requirement of unavailability as the first
of two tests for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause, a section of the Roberts
opinion is devoted to explaining the nuances of establishing unavailability. Roberts, 448
U.S. at 74-75.
155
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availability of the coconspirator to testify.159 The majority scoffed at “the
radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the
government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.”160 Shortly
after Inadi, the Court delivered the coup de grace. In White v. Illinois, the
Court stated that although Roberts “used language that might suggest that the
Confrontation Clause generally requires that a declarant either be produced at
trial or be found unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be admitted
into evidence, such an expansive reading of the Clause is negated by our
subsequent decision in Inadi.”161
To justify its elimination of a central prong of Roberts’s Confrontation
Clause analysis, the White Court pointed not to constitutional text or history,
but to practicality. The majority pontificated that “there is little benefit, if any,
to be accomplished by imposing an ‘unavailability rule.’”162 Such a rule, the
Court explained, was not “likely to produce much testimony that adds
meaningfully to the trial’s truth-determining process” because the prosecution
would presumably produce any persons whose testimony would help its case,
and the defendant could subpoena declarants helpful to the defense.163 The
Court added that the unavailability rule was “likely to impose substantial
additional burdens on the fact-finding process” by forcing the prosecution to
159

United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986). While the majority suggested that it
was faithful to Roberts, the dissent harshly criticized the retreat as “a giant leap” from
precedent. Id. at 401 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 102
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the declarant “was plainly available to
the State” and may have “willingly testified”).
160 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
161 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992). Roberts itself arguably set the stage for
this disavowal in a footnote. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7 (stating that “[a] demonstration of
unavailability, however, is not always required” and citing Dutton v. Evans as an example of
such a circumstance where “the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that
it did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness”).
162 White, 502 U.S. at 354.
163 Id. at 354-55.
As others, including the post-Crawford Court, have noted, it is
insufficient as an interpretive matter to say that the defendant’s right to compel the
appearance of witnesses “in his favor” remedies any deprivation of his right to confront
prosecution witnesses. The compulsory process right is distinct from the confrontation
right, and cannot be sensibly viewed as a substitute for that right, unless one views the
Confrontation Clause as mere surplusage. Friedman, supra note 50, at 1037. Further, the
Confrontation Clause states the defendant “shall enjoy” the right to “be confronted,” a
phrasing that can only mean that the defendant need do nothing to satisfy this right. Id. at
1036; cf. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“[T]he Confrontation
Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to
bring those adverse witnesses into court.”). As a practical matter, the vast chasm of
resources (and oftentimes energy) between prosecution and defense makes the defense’s
ability to subpoena witnesses an even less palatable means of enforcing the confrontation
right. See Jonakait, supra note 48, at 616 (criticizing the Court’s practical arguments
against permitting confrontation).
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“locate and keep continuously available each declarant, even when neither the
prosecution nor the defense has any interest in calling the witness to the
stand.”164 Accordingly, White confined Roberts’s unavailability requirement
to the specific circumstances of that case – where the prosecution sought to
introduce an absent witness’s testimony from a prior judicial proceeding.165
White’s focus on practicality obscured the fact that a requirement that the
prosecution demonstrate the declarant’s unavailability prior to introducing
hearsay was not some idiosyncratic invention of the Roberts majority. Instead,
the historical seeds of this requirement can be found as far back as the trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh – a not insignificant point, given the Supreme Court’s
recent assertion that the “basic purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to
‘targe[t]’ the sort of ‘abuses’ exemplified at the notorious treason trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh.”166
The evidence introduced at Raleigh’s trial consisted primarily of a written
confession of Raleigh’s associate, Lord Cobham, who was imprisoned
nearby.167 Raleigh, suspecting Cobham would, if confronted, recant his
accusations, futilely implored the tribunal to bring Cobham before it:
[M]y Lords, I claim to have my accuser brought here face to face to
speak . . . . If you proceed to condemn me by bare inferences, without an
oath, without a subscription, without witnesses, upon a paper accusation,
you try me by the Spanish inquisition. If my accuser were dead or
abroad, it were something; but he liveth, and is in this very house.168

164

White, 502 U.S. at 355. As noted below, this criticism can be partially defused
through a notice and demand requirement that would require the defense to indicate its
desire to require live testimony from certain witnesses prior to trial. See infra notes 241-242
and accompanying text.
165 White, 502 U.S. at 354 (“Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability
analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged
out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.”). Some
commentators suggest that Roberts’s unavailability requirement survived in a slightly
broader form. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 14, at 694 & n.28 (arguing that the
unavailability requirement after White “applied only to a limited class of hearsay statements
and most clearly only to prior testimony”).
166 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 50 (2004) (stating that “the founding-era rhetoric decried” the “practices that the Crown
deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh’s” and “[t]he Sixth Amendment must be
interpreted with this focus in mind”); see also id. at 44 (relating that one of Raleigh’s judges
later lamented that “the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the
condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kirkpatrick,
supra note 84, at 378 (“The notorious trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 is an important part
of the background of the Confrontation Clause, and was cited repeatedly by Justice Scalia in
Crawford as well as in Davis.”).
167 Cobham implicated Raleigh both in letters and ex parte pretrial examinations. See
Mosteller, supra note 14, at 691 n.15.
168 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 418-19 (London, Charles Knight, Pall Mall East
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As the emphasized sentence suggests, Raleigh viewed witness availability as a
critical component of the confrontation right. In another report of the trial,
Raleigh demurs to the judges’ resistance to his request for confrontation,
stating: “Indeed where the Accuser is not to be had conveniently, I agree with
you; but here my Accuser may; he is alive, and in the house.”169
Fighting for his life, Raleigh did not assail the prosecution simply because it
relied on Cobham’s out-of-court statements. Raleigh emphasized the
prosecutor’s failure to bring before the court a witness who was “in this very
house.”170 Raleigh even concedes that a trial by affidavit might be palatable
were his accuser “not to be had conveniently” because “dead or abroad.” To
Raleigh, and presumably his intended audience, Cobham’s ready availability to
testify was a critical component of the Crown’s injustice.171
While Raleigh’s judges ridiculed his plea for the live testimony of an
available witness,172 his argument, not their rejection of it, stood the test of
time. William Hawkins’s 1721 treatise Pleas of the Crown explains:
There are many Instances in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King
James I, wherein the Depositions of absent Witnesses were allowed as
Evidence in Treason and Felony, even where it did not appear but that the
Witnesses might have been produced viva voce. And it was adjudged in
the Earl of Strafford’s Trial, that where Witnesses could not be produced
viva voce, by Reason of Sickness, &c. their Depositions might be read for
or against the Prisoner on a Trial of High Treason, but not where they
might have been produced in Person.173
Thus, the injustice of allowing the prosecution to rely on unconfronted hearsay
as a matter of choice was recognized well before the Framing, and outlawed in
the Earl of Strafford’s trial in 1680. This was seventy years too late for
Raleigh, but well in advance of the drafting of the Sixth Amendment. In fact,
the dispositive nature of unavailability at the Framing is well established in the

1832) (emphasis added).
169 The Trial Of Sir Walter Raleigh (1603), in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE TRIALS 1, 19 (London, R. Bagshaw et al. 1809) [hereinafter COBBETT’S].
170 JARDINE, supra note 168, at 419.
171 Cf. Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “CrossExamination Rule”: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 558 n.4 (2007) (“[T]he
admission of out-of-court statements by a person who was available to be called as a witness
was one of the notorious defects in Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1603 trial.”).
172 For example, Justice Warburton responded: “I marvel, Sir Walter, that you being of
such experience and wit, should stand on this point; for many horse-stealers should escape if
they may not be condemned without witnesses.” JARDINE, supra note 168, at 421.
173 HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 430; see also WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1367 at 20-24
(describing the evolution of the rule that “the deponent ought to be produced if he can be”);
Davies, supra note 15, at 469 n.111 (quoting this passage and concluding that “Hawkins
indicated that the reading of depositions of available witnesses in treason trials was banned
starting with Strafford’s trial in 1680”).
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historical record. In an article criticizing Crawford and its progeny, Thomas
Davies concludes that, at the time of the Framing, “out-of-court statements of
available witnesses were never admissible as evidence of a defendant’s
guilt.”174 Decades earlier, Graham Lilly reached a similar conclusion,
explaining that “a prevailing principle threads throughout” the eighteenth
century Anglo-American caselaw: “if the declarant was living and could be
produced, he must appear at trial.”175 Consequently, Lilly concluded, as this
Article maintains, that the Framers intended the Confrontation Clause to
“function[] as a rule of preference requiring the presence of the declarant, if
available.”176
Despite the prominent role of history in the Supreme Court’s new
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the privileged place that jurisprudence
assigns to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the Court’s treatment of witness
unavailability has not changed since White. Under Crawford and its progeny,
unavailability is relegated to the same trivial role as in White, functioning as a
limit on the admission of prior, cross-examined testimony (for example, a
deceased witness’s cross-examined testimony in a previous trial) and nothing
more.177 For all practical purposes, the broad Sixth Amendment “preference
for face-to-face accusation” identified in Roberts retains no place in current
doctrine. It is likely no coincidence that when Crawford recounts Raleigh’s
protestations of the Crown’s injustice, it omits Raleigh’s references to
Cobham’s availability.178 Raleigh pointedly emphasized that his absent
accuser was not “dead or abroad” but “liveth, and is in this very house.”179
The Crawford Court deemed this complaint too insignificant to mention.
B.

Unavailability As a Prerequisite to Admitting Nontestimonial Statements

The historical pedigree and Supreme Court precedent enforcing an
unavailability requirement should make such a requirement relatively attractive
to the current Court as a mechanism for restricting nontestimonial hearsay.
More importantly, an unavailability requirement would reintroduce one of the
confrontation right’s essential purposes to modern doctrine – enforcing a
preference for live testimony over hearsay, regardless of the particular species
of hearsay at issue.
This proposal does not require another seismic shift in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. The courts can neatly overlay a Sixth Amendment preference
for live-witness testimony onto modern jurisprudence, by supplementing the
existing bar to unconfronted “testimonial” statements with a requirement that a
174

Davies, supra note 15, at 395-96, 395 n.111.
Lilly, supra note 99, at 212-15.
176 Id. at 215.
177 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (specifying identical requirements for admission of
“former testimony”).
178 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
179 JARDINE, supra note 168, at 418-19.
175
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prosecutor offering an unconfronted “non-testimonial” statement demonstrate
the witness’s unavailability. For the historical and practical reasons identified
in the preceding Parts, the introduction of testimonial statements would
continue to trigger the strictest constitutional protections.180 These statements,
as Crawford holds, should not be admitted at trial absent an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.181 Confrontation Clause doctrine need not restrict
nontestimonial statements as severely. While nontestimonial hearsay can
constitute powerful evidence, there is, by definition, no danger that the
prosecution will consciously elicit such statements to deprive the defendant of
cross-examination.182 Once government malfeasance drops out of the
equation, only one of the confrontation right’s core policies remains – the
preference for live testimony. This preference can be enforced through an
unavailability requirement.
Permitting nontestimonial statements when there is no alternative (that is,
when the declarant is unavailable) does not violate the Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation. The statements, by definition, arose independently of the
litigation. The defendant’s ability to confront the witness is lost by
happenstance. It is the witness’s unavailability, not government scheming, that
is to blame.183 At this point, the Sixth Amendment preference for live-witness
180

Cf. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 561 (1992) (“Hearsay
statements procured by agents of the prosecution or police should . . . stand on a different
footing than hearsay created without governmental intrusion.”); Roger W. Kirst, The
Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485, 493 (1987) (arguing
that unavailability alone is not a sufficient Confrontation Clause test because “the critical
time is not only the time the evidence is offered by the prosecution, but also the time the
hearsay is created by the government for the prosecution”). Historical support for the
proposition that unavailability is not alone sufficient to dispense with confrontation of
testimonial statements can be found in King v. Dingler, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383; 2 Leach
561. In that case, a husband stabbed his wife numerous times resulting in her death. A
magistrate took a statement under oath from the victim, but the court excluded the
statement, rejecting the Crown’s argument that the statement “was the best evidence that the
nature of the case would afford.” Id. at 383.
181 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
182 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154-57 (2011) (explaining that when
statements are elicited by government agents for purposes of establishing facts for purposes
of investigation and, ultimately, litigation, they are “testimonial”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56
n.7 (noting that the “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony”
presents a “unique potential for prosecutorial abuse”). Of course, police or prosecutors
could falsify the origins of a statement to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine, but this
danger cannot be avoided through doctrine. If the authorities are willing to fabricate
evidence, they will avoid any doctrinal hurdles.
183 Cf. Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An
Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 503 (1998) (criticizing hearsay
prohibition generally in a similar context, and asking why, if “[t]he proponent did not create
the evidence, but took it as found,” a “fair fight” would “demand exclusion for lack of cross-
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testimony must bow to “the necessities of the case.”184 The prosecution played
no conscious role in eliciting the statements and is, consequently, not
responsible for their presentation at trial in less than ideal form. The defendant
who objects to the introduction of unconfronted, nontestimonial evidence when
the declarant is unavailable demands the impossible. Just as the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to obtain “witnesses in his
favor” does not require the government to produce unavailable witnesses (so
long as it played no role in causing their unavailability),185 the right to confront
the “witnesses against him” does not necessitate exclusion of out-of-court
statements of witnesses who cannot be brought to court (so long as the
statements were not elicited for purposes of litigation).186
The two-tiered framework set forth above would allow the Court to offer
significant, although not absolute, Confrontation Clause protection to
defendants who, as in Davis and Bryant, face nontestimonial accusations by
absent witnesses. Specifically, this protection would consist of a requirement
that the prosecution demonstrate the unavailability of the out-of-court speaker
The precise measure of
whose statement will be introduced.187
examination when, through no fault of either party, it is not possible to produce better
evidence in the form of the declarant”). To the extent the government is responsible for a
witness’s unavailability, the government would forfeit the ability to rely on unavailability.
See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (holding that the government cannot
invoke a witness’s unavailability if the witness’s “absence was due to the negligence of the
prosecution”).
184 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (“[O]ur precedents establish that ‘the
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a
preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
243 (1895)); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44; Westen, supra note 144, at 600 (“The state fully
exhausts its obligations under the confrontation clause once it produces its evidence in best
available form.”).
185 United States v. Ballesteros-Acuna, 527 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he
Government is ‘under no obligation to look for’ a defendant’s ‘witnesses, in the absence of a
showing that such witnesses were made unavailable through the suggestion, procurement, or
negligence’ of the Government.” (quoting Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 141 (9th
Cir. 1957))); see also United States v. Lee, 906 F.2d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); cf.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding that defendant was “denied his right
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily
denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable
of testifying”).
186 See Westen, supra note 144, at 596 (arguing that the confrontation right should be
interpreted to treat unavailable witnesses in the same manner as the compulsory process
right).
187 Shortly after Crawford, Robert Mosteller advocated reviving Roberts to provide
“weaker” constitutional protections for “problematic,” but nontestimonial hearsay –
specifically, any out-of-court statement that “may be regarded as suspect either because it is
facially unreliable or because it is only barely outside the definition of testimonial

2012]

INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

1903

“unavailability” can be determined by reference to existing case law – the
concept is defined at length in Roberts itself188 – as unavailability already plays
a role in determining the admissibility of prior, cross-examined testimony
under Crawford.189

statements.” Mosteller, supra note 14, at 722. Mosteller’s advocacy for “a guarantee that
helps force confrontation or excludes particularly problematic hearsay statements from a
person whom the defendant cannot confront” sounds a common theme with this Article. Id.
at 712. The instant proposal does not incorporate Roberts’s test for reliability, but does
“force confrontation” in some circumstances where it would be otherwise abandoned. Id.
Tom Lininger seems to have endorsed a similar approach in a brief symposium essay that
cited Oregon case law with approval. See Lininger, supra note 15, at 406 (citing Oregon
courts’ requirement of unavailability as an “attractive alternative” to the Supreme Court’s
abandonment of Confrontation Clause protection for nontestimonial hearsay – a requirement
that limits “the gamesmanship of the pre-Crawford era, when prosecutors called police to
recount victims’ hearsay statements even when the victims were available to testify”).
Lininger has advocated elsewhere for legislatures to amend the hearsay rules to require
unavailability as a prerequisite to the admission of nontestimonial hearsay. See Tom
Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 307 (2006).
In contrast to the arguments presented here, Lininger appears to concede that “originalist
constitutional interpretation” supports the conclusion reached in Davis, but he objects on
policy grounds. Id. at 288 (asserting that the Court’s conclusion in Davis “may accurately
reflect the Framers’ understanding of then-existing law, but originalist constitutional
interpretation does not necessarily make good policy”).
Oregon adheres to a state-constitution-based unavailability requirement for hearsay
admitted against a criminal defendant that appears to result from a refusal to follow White’s
divergence from Roberts. See State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 792 (Or. 2002); State v.
Campbell, 705 P.2d 694, 706 (Or. 1985). Hawaii follows a state-constitution-based
requirement that nontestimonial hearsay satisfy Roberts. See State v. Fields, 168 P.3d 955,
968 (Haw. 2007). Other jurisdictions continue to apply Roberts to nontestimonial hearsay,
but whether they are simply carelessly following pre-Crawford case law or implementing a
state-constitution-based requirement is often unclear. See Sharifi v. State, 993 So. 2d 907,
930 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (suggesting that Roberts-era analysis continues to apply to
nontestimonial hearsay); People v. Hagos, 250 P.3d 596, 624 (Colo. App. 2009); State v.
Brocca, 979 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Dewitz, 212 P.3d 1040,
1050 (Mont. 2009); State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254, 1266 (R.I. 2007); State v. Kaufman,
711 S.E.2d 607, 621 & n.31 (W. Va. 2011); see also Stinski v. State, 691 S.E.2d 854, 868 &
n.2 (Ga. 2010) (applying Roberts analysis to nontestimonial hearsay, but acknowledging
that the basis for doing so has been “undermined”).
188 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (“‘[A] witness is not “unavailable” for
purposes of the . . . exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968))); see also Hardy v. Cross,
132 S. Ct. 490, 493-95 (2011) (reviewing case law defining “unavailability” for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause).
189 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004).
“Unavailability” is also a
component of some standard hearsay exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 804.
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If the prosecution is unable to demonstrate unavailability, it must either call
the witness at trial, or forgo the opportunity to introduce the witness’s
nontestimonial hearsay. This requirement would revive the Sixth Amendment
preference for live-witness testimony, echoing the short-lived command of
Roberts that in the “usual case,” the “prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to
use against the defendant.”190
Little need be said about the benefits of live-witness testimony in an
adversary system. Apart from a rare deviation in White,191 the judicial reports
fawn over cross-examination of live witnesses as an essential element of a fair
trial. The Supreme Court summarizes these sentiments in California v. Green,
stating that such testimony
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath – thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against
the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to
submit to cross-examination, the “greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth”; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.192
Confrontation furthers other important goals as well, including fostering both
the reality and perception of procedural fairness.193 This is because, as Tom
Lininger explains, confrontation is not only “a means to an end, but an end in
itself,” and therefore of value “even when [its] utility” in a particular instance
“may appear negligible.”194
C.

A Historical Exception for Business Records and Analogous Hearsay

While the unavailability requirement proposed in this Article remedies the
key analytical flaw in modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it also
raises a new (albeit minor) problem that must be addressed. Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence has long recognized the admissibility of certain, largely
non-controversial, hearsay even when the declarant is technically available.
For example, both Roberts and Crawford gave wide latitude to the admission
of business records and analogous hearsay. Under Roberts (after White),
business records, public records, and the like were generally admissible
regardless of the availability of the out-of-court declarant because they fell

190

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 (1992).
192 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote omitted) (quoting WIGMORE,
supra note 28, § 1367).
193 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (“The perception that confrontation is
essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it.”).
194 Lininger, supra note 15, at 408.
191
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within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.195 Under Crawford, such evidence is
similarly admissible regardless of witness availability because it is not
testimonial.196
By reintroducing constitutional limits on the admissibility of all hearsay and
tying these limits to witness availability, the framework proposed in this
Article creates a need for a mechanism to admit uncontroversial business
records and analogous hearsay.197 The prosecution should not be blocked, for
example, from proving the amount of money in an embezzler’s bank account
by a constitutional mandate that the prosecution produce every (available)
bank employee who entered a credit or debit to the account.198
There are a variety of ways to approach the admissibility of routine business
and public records under an availability-focused Confrontation Clause.199
Perhaps the cleanest approach is to rely on the same analysis that Crawford

195

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (recognizing historical evidence of
admission of business records, but asserting that such records “by their nature were not
testimonial”); cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
197 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 155, at 667 n.12 (“[A] showing of unavailability of the
declarant is not possible with respect to many types of business and official records, yet
production of the declarant would negate the utility of the exception.”). This difficulty was
apparently partially to blame for Justice Harlan’s abandonment of an availability-focused
theory of the Confrontation Clause. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor raised the concern at oral argument in White as a
strike against any doctrinal unavailability requirement. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12,
supra note 68 (“I suppose if you were correct, then it wouldn’t even be possible to offer
business records in any criminal case.”).
198 Cf. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 988 n.25b (1942) (quoting a memo written by
the Attorney General that claims courts’ failure to liberalize the business records exception
caused “[t]he Government in a number of instances [to be] handicapped in the prosecution
of criminal cases” and providing, as an example, a case where “the Government was
prevented from [introducing] entries in books of a bank . . . unless the specific bookkeeper
who made an entry could identify it” – something that “was impossible in view of the fact
that the bank employed 18 bookkeepers, and since the entries were made by bookkeeping
machines, no one bookkeeper could recall which entries were made by him”); FED. R. EVID.
803(6) advisory committee’s note (articulating desirability of permitting introduction of
business records without “the requirement of producing as witnesses, or accounting for the
nonproduction of, all participants in the process of gathering, transmitting, and recording
information”).
199 Scholarly proposals of alternative approaches to the Confrontation Clause often
advocate special treatment for business records and analogous hearsay. See Jonakait, supra
note 48, at 605 (suggesting a special exception for business records that would operate on a
case-by-case basis depending on whether “the cross-examination of the business declarant
might affect [the jury’s] evaluation of the hearsay”); Westen, supra note 144, at 617-18
(excepting from proposed availability-centered Confrontation Clause framework declarants
that “the defendant could not reasonably be expected to wish to examine”).
196
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applies to dying declarations. In Crawford, the Court recognized that many
dying declarations would qualify as “testimonial” statements.200 Yet, the Court
highlighted the existence of common law “authority” for admitting such
statements and the absence of any indication that the Framers thought the Sixth
Amendment eliminated the venerable dying declaration hearsay exception.201
Consequently, the Court all but endorsed a sui generis exception to the
confrontation right for dying declarations on “historical grounds.”202
The historical record also supports an exception to the Sixth Amendment
preference for live-witness testimony in the case of certain business and public
records. In fact, the Court has already laid some of the necessary groundwork.
Although it never explains their significance to the Crawford framework, the
majority in Melendez-Diaz recognized three “early common-law cases” that
permitted the admission of “records prepared for the administration of an
entity’s affairs” in criminal trials despite the absence of confrontation.203 The

200

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
Id.
202 Id.; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1177 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358, 361-62 (2008). Although the Court has
yet to rule on this question, it appears willing to endorse a historical exception for
unconfronted, dying declarations.
See Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying
Declarations and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1414,
1441 (predicting that “the Court will hold that dying declarations are admissible as an
exception to the Confrontation Clause even when testimonial”). In early Confrontation
Clause cases, the Court confidently proclaimed the admissibility of dying declarations in
dicta. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (“This exception was well
established before the adoption of the Constitution, and was not intended to be abrogated.”);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895). The Court has also not addressed the
contours of this dying declaration exception. The Court might interpret the exception to
allow the prosecution to introduce testimonial hearsay in lieu of an available live witness in
one unlikely scenario – if the statement qualifies as a dying declaration, but the declarant did
not die. The arguments advanced in this Article would support a requirement that the
prosecution call the witness in such a case. Cf. Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (describing the
common law exception as encompassing “declarations made by a speaker who was both on
the brink of death and aware that he was dying”); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (conditioning
admission of a dying declaration on unavailability).
203 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 n.7 (2009) (noting cases that
permitted the introduction of “records prepared for the administration of an entity’s affairs,”
such as a “ship’s muster-book,” a church “vestry book,” and a “prison logbook”); Crawford,
541 U.S. at 56 (acknowledging “business records” as a hearsay exception that was “well
established by 1791” and explaining that the exception dealt with statements that “by their
nature were not testimonial”). Some scholars question the Supreme Court’s assumption
(shared apparently by all the Justices) that English cases shed light on the American
understanding of the right to confrontation. See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 19, at 620-21.
This challenge certainly has some merit as the Framers presumably sought rights beyond
those provided by the King of England. English sources, however, are still relevant to the
inquiry, if for no other reason than to suggest a baseline: it is likely safe to assume that the
201
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Court distinguished the records admitted in those cases from a chemist’s
affidavit swearing to a substance’s narcotic properties on the obvious ground
that the latter was prepared for litigation and thus did not satisfy either the
historical or modern conception of a business or public record.204 The majority
and dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz also recognized that American
courts in the Framing era permitted “a clerk’s certificate authenticating an
official record – or a copy thereof – for use as evidence” in criminal cases.205
According to the majority, “[a] clerk could by affidavit authenticate or provide
a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but could not . . . create a record for
the sole purpose of providing evidence against a defendant.”206 The MelendezDiaz Court’s recognition of common law cases admitting unconfronted
business and public records – so long as the records were not created for
purposes of litigation – implies an openness to a historical exception for
analogous evidence in the modern era.
Melendez-Diaz provides almost no description of the cited business records
cases, but a brief review confirms their potential applicability. In King v.
Rhodes, a prisoner charged with forging John Thompson’s will objected to
admission of a ship’s muster book with the entry: “John Thompson, an able
seaman, died 22 August 1739, at Turtle Bay.”207 The prosecutor responded
that “it was the constant course and uninterrupted practice of the Court to
admit the entry in the muster-book, after it had been authenticated by the Clerk
who signed it, as full evidence of the fact.”208 The English Court seemingly
agreed, overruling the objection and, in so doing, citing another case
(Fitzgerald and Lee) in which “a muster-book was admitted as evidence of the
same kind of fact.”209
In King v. Aickles, a trial court admitted a “daily book . . . containing entries
of the names of all the debtors and criminals who are brought into [Newgate]
prison, and the times when they are discharged” to prove that a convict,
Aickles, prematurely returned from exile.210 The daily book was presented to
protections the Framers envisioned were at least equivalent to those already provided in
English courts. Cf. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (“We are bound to interpret the Constitution in
the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new
guaranties of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he already
possessed as a British subject . . . .”).
204 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321 (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)).
205 See id. at 322; id. at 347 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“During the Framers’ era copyists’
affidavits were accepted without hesitation by American courts.”).
206 Id. at 322-23 (majority opinion); see also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325,
330-31 (1911).
207 King v. Rhodes, (1742) 168 Eng. Rep. 115 (K.B.) 115; 1 Leach 24, 25.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 115-16 (citing King v. Fitzgerald and Lee, (1741) 168 Eng. Rep. 113 (K.B.)
113; 1 Leach 20, 20-21).
210 King v. Aickles, (1785) 168 Eng. Rep. 297 (K.B.) 298; 1 Leach 390, 391. Aickles’s
sentence for grand larceny was commuted on condition that he transport himself overseas,
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the court by Mr. Newman, “clerk of the papers of the prison,” and it was
recognized that the “entries were not made from Mr. Newman’s own
knowledge of the facts,” but from the hearsay statements of “turnkeys.”211 The
court overruled the prisoner’s objection to these “entries made entirely from
hearsay and information.”212
In King v. Martin,213 a criminal libel case, the trial court permitted the
prosecution to introduce a vestry book that recorded the affairs of a parish,
commenting that “[t]he books of the Bank of England, and of other public
companies are evidence to a great variety of purposes.”214 The report contains
the following footnote: “So corporation books, concerning the public
government of a city or town, when they have been publicly kept, and the
entries have been made by a proper officer, are received as evidence of the
facts contained in them.”215

within fourteen days of discharge from prison, for a period of seven years. Id. at 297. The
evidence reflected Aickles’ capture in England a mere two months after his discharge,
presumably violating the condition of commutation (assuming, of course, that the record
accurately evidenced his date of discharge). Id. at 298.
211 Id. The judges distinguished the prison log book from “the books or memorandums
of a tradesman,” by emphasizing the clerk’s status as a “public officer recording a public
transaction” with “no private interest whatsoever in this book.” Id.; see also Brief for
Respondent at 36-37, Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 (No. 07-591) (citing cases).
212 Aickles, 168 Eng. Rep. at 298; see also White v. United States, 164 U.S. 100, 104
(1896) (citing, inter alia, Aickles in rejecting an objection to the admission of jail records).
White adds: “In speaking of entries in books which are evidence in and of themselves,
Greenleaf mentions many kinds of such entries, and among them he includes prison
registers, and cites the cases of Rex v. Aickles and Salte v. Thomas as authority.” White, 164
U.S. at 104 (citations omitted) (citing SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 484, at 533 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1842)).
213 (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1094 (K.B.); 2 Camp. 99.
214 Id. at 1095.
215 Id. (citing Rex v. Mothersall, (1718) 93 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 405, 405; 1 Strange 93, 93;
Thetford’s Case, (1719) 93 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 405, 405; 1 Strange 93, 93). Michael Polelle
identifies three treatise writers who noted the existence of a business records exception for
hearsay at common law. Polelle, supra note 123, at 292 & n.35; see also VAUGHN C. BALL
ET AL., MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 305, at 717-19 (2d ed. 1972)
(discussing evolution of common law business records exception in the years preceding the
Framing); BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at 368 (describing an analogue to the modern
business records exception, that allowed an entry in a shopbook or book of account to be
admitted if the “servant (who was accustomed to make those entries) be dead” as this is “the
best evidence that can then be produced”). Disagreeing with Justice Scalia, and an amicus
brief, Davies argues that “there was no broad framing-era hearsay exception for ‘business
records,’” but only a narrow exception for the admission of the “‘shop-book’ of a merchant .
. . as evidence to prove delivery of goods in civil lawsuits.” Davies, supra note 15, at 362
n.33, 366 n.43 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at 368-69). Davies discusses this issue
in two footnotes and does not address the cases discussed above. See id. In any event, even
Davies’ arguments may allow for isolated examples of the admission of business records in
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Paralleling Crawford’s sui generis exception for dying declarations, the
common law authority discussed above supports a historical exception to the
confrontation right for business records and analogous hearsay – something
that, even if not fully developed at the time of the Framing, few commentators
or judges will likely resist.216 Admission of routine business and public
records without confrontation is generally uncontroversial, and rarely
implicates the textual, historical, or policy concerns of the confrontation right.
The precise nature of the business and public records exception for modern
times would need to be developed through the caselaw, and may turn out to be
narrower than prosecutors might like.217 Nevertheless, as with dying
declarations, some form of the public or business records exception to hearsay
doctrine existed at the time of the Framing. Absent evidence that the Sixth
Amendment’s drafters sought its extermination, this same exception could be
relied upon to admit business and public records (regardless of declarant
availability) over Confrontation Clause objection in the modern era.

criminal cases – which is probably the most that can be expected of a time when, given the
nature of criminal law enforcement, few prosecutions would be expected to rely on business
records. Cf. Langbein, supra note 136, at 1178 (stating that at the time of the Framing,
“written evidence was always relatively unimportant in criminal prosecutions for felony”).
216 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (stating that the Confrontation
Clause “is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law,
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding”). Oregon requires
available hearsay declarants to testify if their hearsay (nontestimonial or otherwise) is to be
admitted. See supra note 187. Applying an analysis similar to that suggested here, the
Oregon courts make an exception to this seemingly blanket requirement for public and
business records, explaining that “the unavailability requirement that otherwise may apply .
. . does not apply in this case, because the framers of the Oregon Constitution would have
understood public and official records to have constituted an exception to the confrontation
rights guarantee.” State v. William, 110 P.3d 1114, 1116-17 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); see also
State v. Partee, 573 P.2d 751, 753-54 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting state and federal
Confrontation Clause challenges to admission of business records even though the
“defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the person who originally
prepared the records”).
217 See FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee’s note (evidencing a desire to broaden
the common law notion of “business records” admissible over a hearsay objection); see also
Salte v. Thomas, (1802) 127 Eng. Rep. 104 (H.L.) 105; 3 Bos. & Pul. 188, 190
(distinguishing Aickles because “there was no document of the fact which was proved [in
that case] but the book itself, and no other evidence could have been resorted to except the
parole testimony of the turnkey who might happen to be in the prison at the time of the
prisoner’s discharge”). Records prepared “for use in litigation” would be inadmissible.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 n.7 (2009); see also Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943); Aickles, 168 Eng. Rep. at 298 (emphasizing that
“Newman has no private interest whatsoever in this book, to induce him to make factitious
entries in it”); cf. Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 369 n.12 (highlighting types of business
records that, contrary to the conclusory assertion of the Crawford majority, seem to require
Confrontation Clause scrutiny).
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
Supplementing existing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with an
unavailability requirement erects real obstacles to prosecutors’ use of
nontestimonial hearsay to prove defendants’ guilt.218 Numerous hearsay
exceptions currently allow prosecutors to introduce out-of-court statements
regardless of the declarant’s availability. For example, the twenty-three
hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permit the
introduction of hearsay “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a
witness.”219 State hearsay rules generally follow suit.220 If prosecutors are
required, as a constitutional matter, to demonstrate unavailability prior to
invoking these exceptions, their ability to introduce hearsay will be
significantly curtailed.221 In cases where prosecutors could previously fill
evidentiary voids with nontestimonial hearsay, the prosecution would either
have to introduce the declarant’s live testimony or demonstrate unavailability.
The effects of the proposed unavailability requirement on prosecutors (and
witnesses) raise important policy concerns. Commentators already criticize
Crawford for exacerbating the difficulties of prosecuting domestic violence
and child abuse offenses where victims are unable or unwilling to cooperate
with prosecutors.222 The government’s merits brief in Inadi similarly criticized

218 Kirkpatrick, supra note 155, at 667 (stating that an unavailability requirement “would
severely restrict the use by prosecutors of numerous hearsay exceptions that have
traditionally been available”).
219 FED. R. EVID. 803. Rule 803 includes exceptions for excited utterances, present sense
impressions, and statements for purposes of medical treatment. Id. Statements of a
coconspirator, agent, or employee can also be admitted without a showing of unavailability.
See FED. R. EVID. 801.
220 See, e.g., HAW. R. EVID. 803; MICH. R. EVID. 803; N.J. R. EVID. 803; N.C. R. EVID.
803; OHIO R. EVID. 803; PA. R. EVID. 803; TEX. R. EVID. 803; W. VA. R. EVID. 803; cf. Glen
Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1525, 1533
(1996) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence have served as a model for many state evidence
codes . . . .”).
221 Many states also provide specific hearsay exceptions designed to admit out-of-court
statements by child victims, but these provisions, like the proposal in this Article, usually
require either the child to testify or a finding of “unavailability.” See Commonwealth v.
Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 163-64 (Pa. 2011) (describing the Pennsylvania statute);
Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 372, 378 n.55. Some states extend “unavailability” in this
context to circumstances where the child, while technically available, would likely be
emotionally traumatized in the process. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation
Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691-92, 700 & n.32; cf. Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th
Cir. 1989) (ruling that “unavailability” for Confrontation Clause purposes included
circumstances where an “attempt to extract evidence from [the victim] in a courtroom
setting was likely to be not only futile but also psychologically harmful to her”).
222 See Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington:
Three Constructive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 535 (2010) (arguing that, in light
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Roberts for articulating an unavailability requirement that would unnecessarily
hamstring complex conspiracy prosecutions; the Court in Inadi adopted these
concerns wholesale.223 The proposal articulated here may be opposed on
similar grounds. As this Part explains, however, the implications of an
unavailability prerequisite to the admission of nontestimonial hearsay are not
as stark as might first be suspected and, in any event, do not form a compelling
basis for rejecting the proposed expansion of the modern confrontation right.
It is worth noting at the outset that not all observers will view the proposed
unavailability requirement negatively. From a defense perspective, the
development is clearly beneficial.224 Viewed in the best light, this is because
there are cases where innocent (or partially innocent)225 defendants’ inability to
cross-examine their accusers deprives the jury of information that would lead
to an acquittal (or less severe sentence). Even in the domestic violence context
where fear of, or affinity for, a cohabitant is a common reason for victim
noncooperation, one cannot entirely discount the possibility that the initial outof-court reports of abuse contain flaws and omissions. Such reports
(particularly as recounted by others) may be overstated or omit details that
could exculpate the defendant or diminish the defendant’s culpability. Outside
of the domestic violence context, this possibility informs the argument,
generally accepted in the United States, that live testimony is a crucial
component of the search for truth and procedural fairness.226 The possibility
cannot be completely discounted in domestic violence, child abuse, or complex
conspiracy prosecutions.

of obstacles raised, particularly in prosecution of domestic violence cases, “Crawford has
set back the quest for rational adjudication”); Lininger, supra note 3, at 768; Orenstein,
supra note 47, at 145. Some of the fears of a drastic effect on domestic violence
prosecutions that emerged have been tempered by the Court’s narrowing view of which
statements are testimonial and its expansive view of forfeiture by wrongdoing. See
Lininger, supra note 3, at 818-19 (writing prior to Davis that one way “to salvage domestic
violence prosecutions after Crawford” is “to engage in the intellectually dishonest exercise
of labeling most statements by victims to police as ‘nontestimonial,’” but arguing that
“[s]uch an approach might seem expedient, but it would not be true to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause”).
223 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1986); see also White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 354-55 (1992); Brief for the United States at 37, Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (No. 841580) (critiquing the “practical wisdom” of an unavailability rule, particularly in “largescale drug conspiracy or organized crime cases”).
224 Kirkpatrick, supra note 84, at 376 (“[A] general consensus exists that it is important
to have the child [victim in a sexual abuse case] testify when possible, given the nature of
the crime and the severity of the penalties.”).
225 A “partially” innocent defendant is guilty of some but not all of the offenses charged,
or is guilty of a lesser offense than the charged offense.
226 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (“The perception that confrontation is
essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it.”);
Lininger, supra note 3, at 772.
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Many observers will, understandably, adopt a different perspective and view
the addition of an unavailability prerequisite to the admission of
nontestimonial hearsay as a practical disaster. To these observers, the
requirement will exacerbate the under-prosecution of domestic violence and
child abuse cases, needlessly burden prosecutions in other contexts, and,
perhaps worst of all, increase the incentive for defendants to cause victims to
fail to appear at trial.227 While these concerns are important, they can be
overstated. There will be few instances where the prosecution must abandon a
case due to an unavailability requirement. When the victim or witness is truly
unavailable (for example, a fearful witness flees the jurisdiction, refuses to
comply with subpoenas, or cannot be located),228 nothing changes: the
prosecution, after making a showing of unavailability, can present any out-ofcourt statements that would be admissible under current doctrine. In addition,
since a witness’s refusal or inability to testify will constitute unavailability, the
proposed reform entails no change in existing incentives for witness
intimidation.229
For the diligent prosecutor, obstacles to admission of hearsay statements
only arise under this proposal when the witness is available. In this scenario,
the prosecutor can overcome the obstacles by securing the witness’s attendance
at trial. If the prosecution produces the witness, the witness’s out-of-court
statements (and in-court testimony) become unobjectionable under the
Confrontation Clause because the defendant can confront the witness.230
Nevertheless, an unavailability requirement will undoubtedly lead to fewer
prosecutions for a number of reasons. Most directly, there may be cases where
the prosecution declines to go forward to relieve an otherwise available victim
or witness of the burden of testifying.231 If the prosecutor could have obtained
a conviction with nontestimonial hearsay, dismissal will be the fault of the new
unavailability requirement. Relatedly, there will be cases where victims and
witnesses will suffer harm and inconvenience from the “ordeal of cross227

Lininger, supra note 3, at 771.
See Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 494 (2011) (reviewing a case in which state
courts deemed the victim of a sexual assault “unavailable” after she fled the jurisdiction to
avoid testifying and could not be located, and upholding the state court ruling as reasonable
interpretation of constitutional law).
229
See United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
witness’s refusal to testify against his father constituted “unavailability” for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause); Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the witness’s refusal to testify out of fear, after receiving threats, constituted
“unavailability” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause).
230 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the
use of his prior testimonial statements.”).
231 Trial testimony is only one aspect of this burden. Even if a victim avoids testifying at
trial, the victim may still be required to testify in a pretrial examination, to a grand jury, or
in semi-formal conferences with police and prosecutors.
228

2012]

INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

1913

examination” if they must testify when previously the prosecution could rely
on nontestimonial hearsay alone.232 If an out-of-court statement is critical to a
case, a prosecutor may go so far as to obtain a material witness warrant to
detain the witness until trial – something that already occurs when an
important case depends on an uncooperative victim’s testimony or testimonial
hearsay, but could occur more frequently with the proposed unavailability
requirement.233
Critics of this proposal will correctly note as well that, as with any
additional doctrinal hurdle, an unavailability requirement will result in a
greater number of prosecutions falling through the cracks. Due to the
unprecedented scope of modern law enforcement, many prosecutors juggle
hundreds of cases at a time.234 A prosecutor may forget to subpoena a witness,
fail to realize the obligation to do so, or simply overlook certain pretrial tasks
due to caseload pressures. This is most likely to occur in misdemeanor cases,
which make up a large portion of domestic violence prosecutions.235 In such
circumstances, a case that could have gone forward based on nontestimonial
hearsay may be dismissed due to the prosecutor’s failure to demonstrate the
declarant’s unavailability. Still, dismissal is neither certain nor dispositive.
The prosecutor could avoid dismissal by seeking a continuance to remedy an
inadvertent failure to subpoena a witness or, if unsuccessful, reinitiate the
prosecution assuming that a dismissal is “without prejudice” (a safe
assumption if the prosecutor’s failure resulted from negligence as opposed to
bad faith).236 If prosecutors refrain from taking these steps due to caseload
pressure or indifference, it is again tempting to blame the unavailability
requirement. In this context, however, the blame is not well placed. The
government must choose how to spend its resources. If the choice is to bring
so many prosecutions (including many prosecutions for non-violent, victimless
crimes)237 that even serious, violent offenders go unpunished due to negligence
232

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
See Lininger, supra note 3, at 787; Orenstein, supra note 47, at 146; Raeder, supra
note 113, at 328. The calculus of whether to prosecute a case against the wishes of a
reluctant victim is complex. See Lininger, supra note 3, at 782; Orenstein supra note 47, at
145, 147 (describing literature suggesting that “Crawford empowers battered women” but
disagreeing because “the so-called ‘autonomy’ of the accuser is illusory in many domestic
violence cases”).
234 See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutor Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 270
(2011).
235 Lininger, supra note 3, at 822 (chronicling survey responses of state prosecutors in
which eighty-two percent reported that a majority of domestic violence cases in their
jurisdictions were misdemeanors).
236 See United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 580 (10th Cir. 1975) (“A dismissal resting
on a non-constitutional ground such as ‘want of prosecution’ or ‘calendar control’ is
normally without prejudice to a subsequent prosecution.”).
237 See Luna, supra note 53, at 777 (chronicling “the overwhelming volume of narcotics
233
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and lack of diligence, the fault lies most squarely with the allocation of
resources, and not with doctrinal rules such as an unavailability requirement
(or, for that matter, the right to a jury trial or the presumption of innocence).238
In addition, the number of cases where prosecutions stall due to the
proposed unavailability requirement can be minimized through judicially or
statutorily authorized pretrial procedures.239 In many domestic violence cases,
for example, it will be clear to the defense that the victim’s presence at trial
will hurt, not help their cause. In such circumstances, the defense may be
willing to waive any availability-based objection to the admission of a victim’s
hearsay statements to decrease the chances that the prosecution will call the
victim to testify.240 The pretrial procedure for obtaining the requisite waiver
could be modeled on the “notice and demand” statutes approved in dicta in
Melendez-Diaz.241 If jurisdictions can create notice-and-demand systems to
relieve government chemists of the burden of testifying when neither party
desires their presence at trial, they can (and should) implement analogous
procedures for civilian witnesses, such as child abuse victims and victims of
domestic violence.242
The real-world implications of Confrontation Clause doctrine are important
to consider. As White’s curtailment of the brief post-Roberts experiment with
a broad unavailability requirement suggests, the chief arguments against the
proposal outlined here may, in fact, be policy based.243 At the same time, a

cases in the legal system”).
238 Cf. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads, a Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U.
L. REV. 143, 155 (2011) (arguing that when prosecutorial resources are overtaxed,
prosecuting agencies can charge fewer cases, focusing existing resources on “the cases that
matter . . . most”). The government may also direct its resources toward identifying and
prosecuting the perpetrators of domestic violence incidents who are most likely to escalate
their violent behavior, and assisting the victims of those perpetrators to safely exit
dangerous situations. A typical misdemeanor prosecution does little to accomplish either of
these goals.
239 Lininger, supra note 3, at 753 (proposing “legislative reforms” to ease domestic
violence prosecutions after Crawford).
240 Remorseful defendants may waive the requirement that a victim testify to minimize
further harm to the victim and, perhaps, curry favor with the judge.
241 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 327 (2009) (stating that “[t]here is no
conceivable reason why” the defendant “cannot . . . be compelled to exercise his
Confrontation Clause rights before trial”); see, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41
(West 2003) (requiring the prosecutor to provide notice of desire to introduce chemist
affidavit, and then requiring the defendant to demand live testimony at least ten days before
trial); cf. Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 883, 892-904 (1991).
242 Unlike a government chemist, however, a crime victim may want to testify in court to
ensure that his or her voice is heard.
243 See supra Part III.A.
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debate on policy grounds is likely impossible to resolve to the satisfaction of
either side.244 To a significant extent, this is the same centuries-old debate that
preceded the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. Raleigh’s judges, like modern
critics, warned of the dire consequences for the King’s justice if Raleigh’s
requested confrontation right were recognized: common criminals would go
free due to practical impediments to prosecution,245 and serious offenses would
“flourish.”246 His judges also questioned the practical utility of confrontation
where, as with Cobham’s self-inculpating confession (according to Chief
Justice Popham, the “strongest” of “all other proofs”), hearsay was selfevidently reliable.247 Reflecting a modern argument in the domestic violence
context, the judges discounted the significance of any change of heart Cobham
might voice in live testimony; after all, any deviation from Cobham’s pretrial
confession would only confirm that Raleigh improperly influenced Cobham
(who, according to the prosecution, “was afraid of Raleigh”) prior to trial.248
Raleigh’s British judges were villains no doubt, but their arguments were
not frivolous. As in Raleigh’s time, reasonable people can disagree about the
tradeoffs required by a robust right to confrontation. The key point, however,
is that the Framers sided with Raleigh. Recognizing the obstacles it might
create for the administration of justice, they granted the accused the right to
“be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The fact that the dangers
foreseen by Raleigh’s judges – the losing party in this debate – now resonate in
244 Cf. Orenstein, supra note 202, at 1455 & n.280; Raeder, supra note 113, at 313-14
(recognizing the difficulty of “ensur[ing] that the voices of women and children are heard,
without eviscerating the ability of the defendant to confront live complainants, and not just
second hand witnesses”).
245 COBBETT’S, supra note 169, at 18 (Justice Wharburton: “[S]o many horse-stealers
may escape, if they may not be condemned without Witnesses.”). Interestingly, Justice
Wharburton’s concern came to fruition in an early American case. See State v. Webb, 2
N.C. (Mart.) 103, 103 (1794) (rejecting effort to introduce deposition of purchaser of stolen
horse in trial of Pleasant Webb “for horse-stealing”).
246 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (stating that “the prosecution
responded” to Raleigh’s requests “with many of the arguments a court applying Roberts
might invoke today”); COBBETT’S, supra note 169, at 18 (“This thing cannot be granted for
then a number of Treasons should flourish . . . .”); JARDINE, supra note 168, at 427
(recounting that Raleigh’s judges thought confrontation was a means “to cover many with
treasons”).
247 JARDINE, supra note 168, at 420.
248 COBBETT’S, supra note 169, at 19 (“There hath been intelligence between you; and
what under-hand practices there may be, I know not.”); id. at 22 (“I observe there was
Intelligence between you and Cobham in the Tower . . . .”); id. at 10 (relaying that Cobham
“was afraid of Raleigh”). Covering all bases, the judges also speculated that if called to
testify, Cobham would falsely exonerate Raleigh out of friendship or, more generically, fall
prey to his rhetorical tricks. Id. at 24 (“Since he must needs have justice, the acquitting of
his old friend may move him to speak otherwise than the truth.”); id. at 18 (“[T]o save you,
his old friend, it may be that he will deny all that which he hath said.”); id. at 18 (“[T]he
Accuser may be drawn by practice.”).
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our own administration of justice suggests not that Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence is off track, but that it is finally finding its proper role.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice John Marshall thought that the inadmissibility of informal, outof-court statements offered in the 1807 prosecution of Aaron Burr was a fairly
easy call. The Chief Justice wondered why “a man should have a
constitutional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere
verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence against him.”249
Two centuries later, the Davis Court also viewed the constitutional treatment
of mere verbal declarations (i.e., “nontestimonial” statements) as fairly
obvious.250 But the Court came to the opposite conclusion. Someone is wrong
here and, given Chief Justice Marshall’s proximity to the Framing era, it is
hard to side against him. The proximity intuition is not all we have, however.
As this Article details, there is abundant evidence to conclude that the Davis
Court, not Chief Justice Marshall, misread the authority on this critical point.
The Court’s error can be shown as a matter of textual and historical analysis.
In addition, when applied to real-world fact patterns, as in Davis and Bryant,
the Court’s conclusion that the out-of-court speakers of “nontestimonial”
statements are not “witnesses against” the defendant vanishes in a puff of
common sense.
The Court’s error in placing nontestimonial hearsay outside the bounds of
the Confrontation Clause, while serious, does not damn the entire
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court is right to finally focus its Confrontation
Clause analysis on core, “testimonial” hearsay. Framing-era authorities
recoiled at the prospect of the admission of such evidence, and for good
reason. The Court must preserve this intuition while revisiting its conclusion
that hearsay falling outside this core class of statements triggers no
Confrontation Clause protections whatsoever.
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